In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
On June 30, 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro arrived in Qatar to meet Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, who serves jointly as the Gulf emirate’s prime minister and foreign minister. While previous Somaliland presidents have visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the visit to Qatar appeared a diplomatic breakthrough as it marked an expansion of Somaliland’s diplomatic reach.
The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affair’s subsequent statement was an insult, one that should disqualify Qatar from any future role mediating conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Qatari press release stated that it was “the State of Qatar’s belief that Somalia’s future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”
Put aside the fact that neither under President Mohamed Farmaajo nor Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has the Federal Republic of Somalia respected constitutional federalism. Under both unelected leaders, the federal government in Mogadishu has encroached on the constitutional rights of Puntland, Jubaland, and the South West State. Both Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh divert international aid both to their own supporters in Mogadishu and into their own personal bank accounts in countries and territories like Switzerland and Gibraltar or property holdings in Türkiye. The two presidents have hijacked security assistance meant to counter Al-Shabaab in order to target their own political opponents. Meanwhile, both leaders have repeatedly sold Somalia’s sovereignty to the highest bidder, be it Chinese fishing concessions or land grants and construction contracts to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. How does Qatar expect anyone to respect Somalia’s sovereignty when its own leaders make a mockery of it?
Greater Somalia is as much a dream as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Kenya’s former North Eastern Province will never return to Mogadishu’s control. To state that is not to be anti-Somali; after all, more Somalis live outside Mogadishu’s control than inside it and have no desire to be under Mogadishu’s control. Why would they wish to join the least successful, most corrupt, and most dysfunctional government of all Somali-populated regions? If Qatar is not going to share its gas wealth with Egypt’s impoverished Arab population or subject itself to Baghdad’s corrupt leadership, why does Qatar believe Somaliland should give Somalia title over its scant resources?
The real hypocrisy, however, is in any comparison of historical grounds by which Qatar justifies its independence with its own hostility toward Somaliland’s case. After Arabs ended Persian rule over Bahrain in the 18th century AD, the Khalifa family took control not only ruling Bahrain’s main island, but also the Qatar peninsula. Over subsequent decades, the ancestors of Qatar’s current rulers staged a number of rebellions, most unsuccessful. In 1861, Bahrain and British Indian authorities signed a treaty recognizing Qatar as a dependent of Bahrain. In the 1867 Bahrain-Qatar War, Bahraini forces completely destroyed Doha and Wakrah, much as Somali dictator Siad Barre would do just over a century later to Hargeisa. The following year, the British government imposed a settlement that recognized Qatar as a separate entity. In effect, British forces confirmed Qatar’s distinctness less than two decades before they did the same thing in Somaliland.
While Qatar appears to buy the logic of Somali irredentists who say that clan identity should not be enough to justify Somaliland’s independence, the only difference between Qatar, Bahrain’s ruling family, and the United Arab Emirates is tribal identity. Qataris may argue that the Khalifa’s family’s persecution of the Thani shaped Qatari identity, but even the worst Bahraini persecution of Qatari tribes was orders of magnitude less than what Siad Barre and his Darod clan did to Somaliland’s Isaaq.
Qatar’s hypocrisy gets worse, however. While the British may have recognized the Qataris as a distinct entity in 1868, independence did not come for more than a century. Prior to the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, and the seven Trucial State were part of a joint Federation of Arab Emirates that the British envisioned maintaining control. Qatar and Bahrain ultimately refused to cede political and economic autonomy to the new entity; both unilaterally declared their independence leaving the Trucial States to form the United Arab Emirates.
Qatar today enjoys full independence. Its history shows its willingness to take up arms to prevent outside powers from forcing it into an unwanted union with either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates. How ironic, then, that its approach to Somaliland forgets its own origins and negates the principles upon which its independence rests.
About the Author
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.
Dr. Rubin has a PhD and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
An $8 Billion Air Base, a Terror Portfolio, and Qatar’s High-Stakes Pressure Campaign to Keep the US Out of Berbera
What appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough for Somaliland has unmasked what senior officials describe as a sophisticated diplomatic campaign by Qatar aimed at one primary objective: preventing the establishment of a US military base in Berbera.
Instead of issuing an outright warning, the unprecedented visit was dominated by a subtle but unmistakable focus from Qatari officials on Somaliland’s future intentions regarding a potential United States military base in Berbera. Through a persistent and highly specific line of questioning, Qatari officials sought to extract the precise nature of Somaliland’s security consultations with the United States. This penetrating focus on the Berbera base stunned the delegation, according to a senior Somaliland official who was present, revealing the true strategic intent behind Qatar’s sudden diplomatic outreach: to preempt a security partnership that could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. The message, though never stated as an explicit warning, was unmistakable: any move by Somaliland to host American forces would be viewed by Doha as a direct challenge to its own strategic position.
The Al Udeid Strategic Imperative
Qatar’s sudden interest in Somaliland cannot be separated from its existential interest in protecting Al Udeid Air Base—its single most valuable geopolitical asset. Since 2003, Doha has poured more than $8 billion into the sprawling desert facility, which hosts over 10,000 U.S. personnel and serves as the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Al Udeid is not just a military hub; it is Qatar’s insurance policy—one that has shielded it from regional isolation, granted it disproportionate diplomatic weight, and bound U.S. policy interests tightly to its survival.
But that calculus begins to fall apart when Berbera enters the frame.
Unlike landlocked Al Udeid, Berbera offers direct access to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—one of the most vital maritime corridors in the world. It is the only potential U.S. partner location between Diego Garcia and the Suez Canal with that level of strategic access. From a power-projection standpoint, Berbera can do what Al Udeid never could: impose influence over both flanks of the Red Sea. It would also place U.S. surveillance assets within striking range of China’s military base in Djibouti, creating a direct counterweight to Beijing’s creeping dominance.
That prospect is especially relevant now. With China having all but squeezed the U.S. military presence out of Djibouti—AFRICOM operations increasingly marginalized and confined—the United States is in urgent need of an alternative forward operating position. The strategic implications are not lost on Qatar. A permanent U.S. military presence in Berbera would not only devalue Al Udeid, it would also dilute Qatar’s influence over U.S. regional posture. No longer the indispensable host, Qatar would find its monopoly on American dependence broken. For Doha, this isn’t just about geography. It is about leverage, prestige, and survival.
That is why the Berbera question was not just a curiosity during President Cirro’s visit—it was the point.
Diplomatic Sleight of Hand and Public Backlash
Qatar’s handling of the visit reveals a calculated diplomatic strategy that was widely seen in Somaliland as designed to discredit and embarrass the President of the Republic of Somaliland and his delegation. While the high-level meeting between President Cirro and Qatar’s Prime Minister offered a significant platform for Somaliland, the official statement released by Doha immediately afterward seemed engineered to erase that very status.
The Qatari Foreign Ministry press release conspicuously described the meeting as covering “the latest developments in Somalia,” and concluded with an unambiguous reaffirmation of “respect for the sovereignty and unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”
This linguistic sleight of hand—using the prestige of a prime ministerial meeting as a backdrop for a political rebuke—was interpreted in Hargeisa as a deliberate affront. Across social media and in commentary by political analysts, the prevailing view was clear: Qatar had staged a high-level photo-op for the sole purpose of reaffirming its hostility toward Somaliland’s political identity in the most public way possible.
“It was diplomatic pageantry with a political knife,” remarked one prominent politician and a member of the President’s party who did not want to be quoted for speaking on the president’s visit. “You don’t grant a president that level of access just to write him out of the story in your press release, this was intentional.” The fallout has only reinforced growing skepticism among Somalilanders about the value of engaging regional powers who remain tethered to the political fiction of Somali unity.
The Double Threat: How Berbera Undermines Qatar’s Entire Regional Strategy
Qatar’s alleged willingness to mediate with Al-Shabaab while propping up the internationally recognized government in Mogadishu is central to its “whole pie” strategy: controlling all major factions to make itself indispensable. According to two regional intelligence analysts and one senior Horn of Africa diplomat, this entire edifice of influence is directly threatened by the emergence of a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Somaliland as a strategic U.S. ally.
A formal U.S.–Somaliland security partnership presents what one source called a “double threat” for Doha. First, it represents a complete rejection of Doha’s Somalia-centric architecture, as a robust U.S. military presence in Berbera would operate entirely outside its influence network. Second, and just as critically, a U.S. base in Berbera would devalue Al Udeid—Qatar’s crown jewel—reducing the Gulf state’s leverage over Washington on a global scale.
The Terror Portfolio: A Lever for Coercive Control
This alleged use of militant proxies fits into a broader, more audacious regional pattern. According to multiple sources in the region’s security community—including one diplomat formerly stationed in Doha—Qatar is actively mediating between Al-Shabaab and elements of the Somali federal government. These sources allege that Doha’s strategy involves using its influence to modulate the group’s operations: easing the tempo of attacks to reward compliance and ramping up violence to punish political defiance. Qatar has previously denied any ties to Al-Shabaab or involvement in Somalia’s internal security dynamics.
Gulf Rivalry and a Trail of Blood
The intense focus on a potential US base in Berbera carries ominous weight when seen through the lens of the Gulf proxy war. A chilling precedent is the assassination of a DP World contractor in Puntland. On February 4, 2019, Paul Anthony Formosa, manager for P&O Ports—a DP World subsidiary—was gunned down at the Bosaso port. While Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, a high-profile leak later suggested a more sinister backstory. In July 2019, The New York Times published a report on a leaked phone call in which a Qatari businessman bragged that violence in Bosaso had been carried out by “our friends” to “make Dubai people run away from there.” While the Qatari government quickly disavowed the individual, the incident underscored the blurred lines between commercial rivalry and sanctioned destabilization.
Escalation Calculus: The Real Cost of Strategic Obstruction
The evidence is mounting that Doha views a U.S. base in Berbera not as a diplomatic inconvenience, but as a direct threat to the heart of its regional strategy. The carefully choreographed outreach to Hargeisa—followed by a calculated public embarrassment—were not missteps. They were the opening moves in what appears to be a broader campaign of obstruction.
Given Qatar’s documented playbook—from alleged backchannel dealings with Al-Shabaab to its reported role in fomenting violence against commercial competitors—the question is no longer if Doha will escalate, but how.
If Qatar was allegedly willing to flirt with sanctioned terror networks and tolerate bloodshed to preserve its influence in Somalia, what measures might it now be willing to employ to shield an $8 billion military asset and salvage its waning relevance in the Horn of Africa? The stakes are exponentially higher, and so too is the potential for coercive interference cloaked in diplomacy.
The Somaliland government did not provide an official, on-the-record comment for this story. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also sent a detailed list of questions regarding the strategic threat a Berbera base poses to Al Udeid, the contradiction between hosting President of the Republic of Somaliland while officially reaffirming Somalia’s unity, and its alleged role as a mediator for the Al-Shabaab terror group. No response was received by press time
ANALYSIS | Washington Brokers DRC–Rwanda Peace After 30 Years of War Based on the U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin – June 29, 2025
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a comprehensive peace agreement on June 27, 2025, ending three decades of conflict that has devastated the Great Lakes region of Africa. The signing ceremony at the U.S. State Department, witnessed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, caps months of difficult negotiations and represents a significant diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration.
The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement goes beyond previous failed attempts by establishing concrete mechanisms for implementation, including a joint security coordination system and specific timelines for disarming rebel groups. Most importantly, the 2025 peace deal addresses the central issue that has fueled the Great Lakes conflict: the presence of FDLR militants in eastern Congo, remnants of the forces responsible for Rwanda’s 1994 genocide.
DRC Rwanda Peace Agreement Details: Key Provisions and Implementation
Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, who led the U.S. negotiating team for the DRC-Rwanda peace talks, structured the discussions around specific operational details rather than broad promises. The comprehensive peace agreement includes provisions for territorial integrity, cessation of hostilities, disarmament of non-state armed groups, and the establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism building on existing frameworks from the Luanda Process.
The key breakthrough in the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement involves Rwanda’s commitment to lift defensive measures along its border in exchange for concrete action against the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe emphasized that the FDLR “is no ordinary militia” but rather “the remnant of the forces which committed the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.”
Qatar’s role in the DRC-Rwanda peace process proved crucial despite its official status as an observer. Qatari officials facilitated the initial meetings that broke the diplomatic deadlock in the Great Lakes conflict. Minister of State Mohammed Al-Khulaifi continues separate negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 rebel group, creating parallel tracks that could prove essential for lasting peace in the region.
U.S. Africa Policy 2025: Strategic Partnerships and Diplomatic Engagement
The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement signing coincided with several other African diplomatic engagements that reveal broader U.S. Africa policy priorities under the Trump administration. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued statements marking independence celebrations for Mozambique, Madagascar, and Djibouti—each highlighting different aspects of American strategic interests in Africa.
Mozambique’s 50th independence anniversary statement emphasized U.S.-Africa partnerships in critical minerals, natural gas, and agriculture. Madagascar’s 65th independence celebration focused on maritime security and cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and African nations. Djibouti, marking 48 years of independence, was praised for its role in Horn of Africa regional stability and its hosting of American military facilities.
These diplomatic statements, while ceremonial, indicate which African partnerships the U.S. considers most valuable: resource-rich countries, maritime security partners, and strategic military hosts in key regions like the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes.
Statement from Senator Jim Risch: “A Real Chance for Lasting Change”
In a strong show of bipartisan support, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), who attended the signing, issued the following statement:
“President Trump and Secretary Rubio have shown crucial leadership in working to end the brutal conflict in Eastern Congo, a conflict that has driven regional instability and immense human suffering for decades. While the signing of this agreement does not guarantee immediate peace, it creates a real chance for lasting change. Now, it is up to the parties to honor and fulfill their commitments.
It is in America’s national security interest to see this agreement fully implemented without delay. There must be consequences if the parties fail to deliver, or spoilers undermine its implementation.”
Great Lakes Conflict Resolution: Implementation Challenges Ahead
Both foreign ministers acknowledged the significant challenges facing DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation during the signing ceremony. DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner warned that “no text, however carefully negotiated, can carry on its own the weight of peace.” She referenced feedback from Congolese women’s organizations demanding “a peace that is real, lived, shared, and built with us.”
The Great Lakes peace agreement’s immediate test will come with the planned White House summit in the coming weeks, where DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda President Paul Kagame will meet to finalize implementation details. More challenging will be the actual disarmament of armed groups and the return of displaced populations—processes that have derailed previous Great Lakes conflict resolution efforts.
Rwanda has already indicated it will begin implementing the neutralization of FDLR forces, while the DRC has committed to facilitating the return of Rwandan refugees. These parallel processes will require sustained international monitoring and support to succeed in ending the decades-long Great Lakes conflict.
Congressional support for the DRC-Rwanda peace process has been notable, with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch and Senator Mike Rounds attending the signing ceremony. This bipartisan backing may prove crucial for maintaining American engagement during the difficult implementation phase of the Great Lakes peace agreement.
African Conflict Resolution 2025: Regional Impact and Future Prospects
The Great Lakes conflict has affected far more than just the DRC and Rwanda over the past three decades. Millions of people have been displaced by the DRC-Rwanda conflict, regional trade has been disrupted, and armed groups have proliferated across Central and East African borders. The 2025 peace agreement could unlock significant economic potential in a Great Lakes region rich in minerals essential for global technology production.
Success in DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation might also influence other African conflict resolution efforts. Senior Advisor Boulos has already indicated that Sudan represents the next target for similar U.S. mediation efforts, suggesting the Trump administration sees this as a replicable model for American diplomatic engagement in African conflicts.
However, the Great Lakes region’s history of failed peace agreements suggests caution about long-term success. Previous DRC-Rwanda peace efforts have collapsed when international attention shifted elsewhere or when domestic political calculations changed. The presence of multiple armed groups like M23 and FDLR, weak state institutions, and competing economic interests all pose ongoing threats to sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region.
The involvement of Qatar in African diplomacy adds another significant dimension to conflict resolution efforts. Gulf states have been expanding their diplomatic and economic presence across Africa, often in coordination with rather than competition against Western powers. This U.S.-Qatar cooperation in the DRC-Rwanda peace process could become a template for future diplomatic initiatives across the African continent.
This analysis of the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement is based on official U.S. Department of State documents and statements from the June 29, 2025 Weekly Digest covering African diplomatic developments.
Somaliland, with its prime location on the Gulf of Aden and immediate proximity to Ethiopia, holds unparalleled potential as a trade and logistics gateway for the landlocked East African giant. Currently, over 90% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade is channeled through Djibouti, a logistical overreliance that raises costs and exposes the country to potential supply chain vulnerabilities (AfDB, 2019). Somaliland’s Berbera Port and the Berbera Corridor, backed by substantial investments from DP World and the UAE, offer an efficient and competitive alternative, reducing both distance and time for goods traveling from Ethiopia’s highlands to international markets (DP World Berbera, 2022). Furthermore, the historical, cultural, and commercial ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland lay a strong foundation for deepening trade relations. As emphasized by the World Bank (2020), landlocked economies benefit significantly from diversified trade corridors. To capitalize on this, Somaliland must actively present itself as a politically stable and business-ready partner, an image it can sustain given its track record of relative peace in a volatile region.
2. Infrastructure, Connectivity, and Trade Facilitation
Infrastructure remains the cornerstone of Somaliland’s ambitions to attract Ethiopian trade. The modernization of Berbera Port, equipped with a new container terminal and extended quays, has enhanced its capacity and global appeal. In parallel, the Berbera Corridor has already facilitated increased goods movement, while plans for rail connectivity with Ethiopia could unlock bulk freight opportunities, reduce road congestion, and enhance efficiency (AfDB, 2021). Logistics infrastructure like dry ports, bonded warehouses, and cold storage facilities near the Tog Wajale border is essential to manage cargo effectively and expand perishable goods trade. Harmonized customs procedures and digitized trade systems, as advocated by the World Economic Forum (2020), can reduce border delays by up to 40%, further boosting trade competitiveness. Moreover, energy security through potential Ethiopia–Somaliland cooperation in renewable power can support industrial zones and processing plants. Establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the corridor will offer Ethiopian manufacturers tax incentives, simplified regulations, and a strategic location to re-export to Gulf markets.
3. Regulatory Reforms and Investment Climate Improvement
Attracting sustained Ethiopian investment requires a transparent, efficient, and legally secure business environment. Somaliland must prioritize reforms to ease business registration, ensure contract enforcement, protect investor rights, and reduce tariffs on capital goods (World Bank Doing Business Report, 2021). A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Ethiopia, even under Somaliland’s unrecognized status, could offer Ethiopian investors legal certainty and arbitration frameworks. Lessons from the East African Community (EAC Report, 2020) show that trade agreements and regulatory harmonization can increase intra-regional trade by up to 30%. Institutional capacity must also be strengthened: customs officers, port personnel, and investment promotion agencies require technical training and resourcing. The establishment of a Somaliland-Ethiopia Joint Trade Commission could serve as a formal mechanism to resolve disputes, coordinate investment initiatives, and evaluate cross-border bottlenecks. Additionally, international agencies like UNCTAD (2021) underscore the importance of anti-corruption policies and public-private partnerships in building investor trust areas, where Somaliland must show consistent progress.
4. Investment Opportunities and Sectoral Diversification
Somaliland’s economic transformation depends on diversifying investment inflows beyond ports and livestock. Ethiopian entrepreneurs and firms can explore untapped sectors such as agro-processing, fisheries, renewable energy, tourism, and financial services. The Berbera Corridor provides an ideal base for agro-processing ventures that add value to farm produce from both Ethiopia and Somaliland, targeting export markets (ITC, 2021). Ethiopia’s proven success in renewable energy projects, especially hydropower and wind, offers an opportunity for technology transfer and grid interconnectivity to support Somaliland’s industrial ambitions (IRENA, 2020). The livestock sector, long a regional staple, can also be formalized with joint quarantine, veterinary, and export systems aimed at Gulf consumers. As Ethiopia’s urban middle class grows, Somaliland’s tourism industry, featuring coastal sites and cultural heritage, could attract leisure and business travelers, particularly with improved connectivity. Moreover, investment in services such as telecom, education, and banking would enhance both economies and foster regional interdependence (World Tourism Organization, 2019).
5. Partnerships, Risk Management, and Future Outlook
To unlock its full economic potential, Somaliland must strategically engage regional and global partners. Collaborating with IGAD, the African Union, and financial institutions like the World Bank and AfDB will provide technical assistance, capacity building, and infrastructure financing (AfDB, 2020). The UAE’s investments in Berbera signal international confidence in Somaliland’s trade proposition, which can be used to attract Ethiopian firms seeking a stable logistics partner with global linkages (Gulf News, 2021). Diaspora networks from both countries, particularly in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, can play a pivotal role in mobilizing capital, building trust, and facilitating market entry. However, challenges remain: political non-recognition restricts access to some multilateral mechanisms; infrastructure must be maintained; and trade must be secured from smuggling and conflict. Risk mitigation strategies such as trade insurance, customs cooperation, and environmental safeguards are necessary for sustainability (UNODC, 2019). With a visionary approach blending diplomacy, reform, and cross-border cooperation, Somaliland is poised to become Ethiopia’s second major trade lifeline, reshaping the economic map of the Horn of Africa.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Somaliland stands at a pivotal moment in its economic development trajectory, uniquely positioned to emerge as Ethiopia’s strategic trade partner in the Horn of Africa. Its proximity, political stability, and ongoing infrastructure upgrades—especially through the Berbera Port and Corridor have laid the foundation for a mutually beneficial trade and investment partnership. As documented by the World Bank (2020), diversified trade routes are essential for landlocked countries like Ethiopia to reduce dependency, enhance resilience, and drive down transaction costs. Somaliland’s offer of a competitive logistics alternative supports this goal, while also boosting its economic profile.
Furthermore, the African Development Bank (2021) and UNCTAD (2021) emphasize that infrastructure must be complemented by institutional reform, investment-friendly policies, and regional cooperation to unlock true trade potential. Somaliland’s efforts to modernize customs, implement regulatory reforms, and engage in bilateral diplomacy are aligned with these recommendations. The successful expansion of the Berbera Port under DP World’s management also mirrors findings from Gulf News (2021), which show that international partnerships significantly enhance investor confidence and operational efficiency in emerging markets.
Most importantly, the economic synergy between Ethiopia and Somaliland can go beyond logistics. As shown in studies by the International Trade Centre (2021) and IRENA (2020), sectoral integration in agro-processing, renewable energy, and services can create value chains that benefit both nations. By leveraging these sectoral complementarities, Somaliland can position itself not just as a transit hub, but as an active contributor to regional industrialization and economic diversification.
To realize this vision, however, Somaliland must maintain momentum in infrastructure development, invest in institutional capacity, and adopt risk mitigation mechanisms against political and economic uncertainties echoing policy recommendations from the International Crisis Group (2020) and UNODC (2019). If coordinated effectively, these strategies can transform the Ethiopia Somaliland corridor into a model for trade-led regional integration, offering a resilient, efficient, and inclusive economic bridge that benefits millions across the Horn of Africa.
References
African Development Bank (AfDB). (2019–2021). Regional Infrastructure & Trade Reports.
DP World Berbera. (2022). Port Development Briefings.
World Bank. (2018–2022). Trade Corridors and Doing Business Reports.
International Trade Centre (ITC). (2021). Trade Facilitation in Africa.
UNCTAD. (2019, 2021). Investment Promotion and Legal Framework Reports.
World Economic Forum. (2020). Trade Digitalization Insights.
IRENA. (2020). Renewable Energy in the Horn of Africa.
Gulf News. (2021). UAE–Horn of Africa Trade Projects.
UNODC. (2019). Illicit Trade and Border Security Reports.
East African Community (EAC). (2020). Trade Integration Reports.
World Tourism Organization. (2019). Regional Tourism Trends.
About the Author
Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali is an infrastructure analyst based in Somaliland, specializing in regional development across the Horn of Africa with particular expertise in Somaliland’s infrastructure landscape. Drawing from more than ten years of hands-on experience in project leadership and infrastructure development, he combines practical field knowledge with academic excellence as both a researcher and senior lecturer. Eng. Mouktar Yusuf holds a Master of Science degree in Project and Programme Management and Construction Management, positioning him as a leading voice on infrastructure policy and development in the region.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro’s” departure for Qatar aboard a private jet, following an official invitation from Doha, has ignited a critical question that cuts to the heart of Horn of Africa geopolitics: What does Qatar, long considered Somalia’s primary patron state, truly want with Somaliland?
This unprecedented diplomatic overture arrives at a moment when global discourse on Somaliland’s recognition has reached a fever pitch. The invitation represents either a breakthrough that finally acknowledges Somaliland’s strategic value, or a calculated maneuver to drag Somaliland back into the Somali quagmire that Qatar has spent years cultivating.
The Qatar-Somalia Nexus: Following the Money
Qatar emerged as the main backer of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo,” with opposition figures and international observers alleging that Qatari influence shaped the 2012 and 2017 election outcomes through financial incentives. This established Doha as the power broker behind Mogadishu’s political theater. Farmajo’s current residence in Doha—following reports of his 2019 renunciation of U.S. citizenship—serves as a permanent reminder of Qatar’s deep investment in Somali political figures.
For over a decade, Qatar has poured resources into Somalia, positioning itself as the indispensable mediator in a failed nation that exists only in headlines and the occasional complaint about violation of its territorial integrity. Yet here stands Qatar, extending a formal invitation to the very entity that represents Somalia’s greatest existential challenge.
The contradiction is stark: Why would Somalia’s primary benefactor legitimize the leadership of a territory that Mogadishu claims as its own? The answer may lie in Qatar’s broader agenda—controlling the entire “Somali” equation by maintaining influence in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu.
Uncle Sam: The Elephant in the Bab-al-Mandeb
The United States may be the geopolitical force driving Qatar’s sudden interest more than any Gulf rivalry. Washington’s engagement with Somaliland has moved well beyond diplomatic courtesy calls.
A recent U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley and Gen. Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command, traveled to Somaliland to meet with President Cirro and discuss “shared security, maritime, and defense interests.” The delegation’s assessment of infrastructure capabilities at Berbera port signaled concrete steps towards deeper military cooperation.
This strategic pivot reflects America’s escalating competition with China. Somaliland represents a rare opportunity: a stable, pro-Western partner in a region where Beijing has made significant inroads. While Somalia maintains complex relations with China, Somaliland’s formal bilateral ties with Taiwan position it as a natural ally in America’s strategic competition.
Qatar, serving as Washington’s go-to mediator in complex regional disputes, likely possesses greater insight into American strategic thinking than even Somaliland’s government. If the U.S. is moving toward recognition—driven by the imperative of securing the Bab-al-Mandeb chokepoint and countering Chinese influence—Qatar must position itself advantageously before that decision crystallizes.
The UAE Factor: Gulf Rivalry Spills into Africa
Qatar’s overture cannot be separated from its bitter rivalry with the UAE. Despite being Somaliland’s largest foreign investor through DP World’s development of the Berbera port, the UAE has remained cautious about offering political concessions. Abu Dhabi has consistently stopped short of providing the diplomatic recognition that Somaliland seeks most desperately.
If Abu Dhabi won’t provide political legitimacy to match its economic investments, Doha may seize the opportunity to outflank its Gulf rival by offering what the UAE won’t: genuine diplomatic engagement at the highest levels. This invitation represents the latest move in a proxy chess game that has transformed the Horn of Africa into another theater for Gulf competition.
The Recognition Trap: Mediation or Manipulation?
The central question remains: Is this genuine outreach or a sophisticated gambit designed to revive the dormant Somaliland-Somalia dialogue under Qatari mediation?
Qatar has brokered agreements in the Horn before, consistently working to strengthen central government structures. If Doha’s objective is to restart what Mogadishu calls “reconciliation talks,” President Cirro’s government must proceed with extreme caution. This concern is particularly acute following Somaliland’s formal suspension of all dialogue with Somalia in April 2025, a move made in response to what it termed “calculated provocation” from Mogadishu.
These talks have served Somalia’s devious yet brilliantly simple purpose: convincing the international community and the world at large that Somaliland is not serious about recognition and is, in fact, working to “reconcile” with Mogadishu. While achieving nothing substantive, these talks have been a masterpiece of Somali diplomatic deception. Somalia frames the process as reconciliation between estranged brothers, while Somaliland politicians have repeatedly fallen into the trap of repackaging them as a “dialogue for separation”—a contradiction that has only muddied Somaliland’s narrative on the global stage.
The psychological effect has been devastating. Every time Somaliland leaders sit down for these talks, they inadvertently signal to the world that perhaps their independence isn’t so final after all. International observers see these discussions and conclude that even Somaliland’s own leadership believes unity remains possible—why else would they keep talking? Meanwhile, Somalia gets to play the patient, reasonable party always willing to welcome its “wayward region” back home.
The Qatar invitation could represent an attempt to revive this diplomatic theater, with Doha positioning itself as the indispensable mediator.
Strategic Implications: The Whole Pie Strategy
Qatar’s approach suggests a “whole pie” strategy—rather than backing either Somaliland or Somalia exclusively, Doha may be positioning itself to control both sides of the equation. By maintaining its traditional support for Mogadishu while simultaneously courting Hargeisa, Qatar could emerge as the indispensable external power regardless of how the recognition question ultimately resolves.
This strategy would mirror Qatar’s broader Middle Eastern approach, where it maintains warm relations with Iran while serving as a key American ally, playing all sides to maximize its leverage and influence.
For Somaliland, the calculation is complex. At a time when recognition momentum appears stronger than ever, with international attention at unprecedented levels, any engagement that could be perceived as legitimizing renewed union talks carries enormous risks.
Official Positions: Exploration, Not Expectations
According to multiple government and diplomatic sources briefed on the matter, the Qatar visit is exploratory in nature and may not yield major visible breakthroughs. “Somaliland is open for business and is willing to explore ways to work with other nations even if there are divergent views on certain areas,” one senior official stated, emphasizing Hargeisa’s pragmatic approach to international engagement.
When pressed about the potential restart of Somaliland-Somalia talks, one source was dismissive: “That is not a thing at the moment and we all know Somalia is not in a position to negotiate anything at the moment, so it may or may not come up during the visit, but our position on the matter is clear.”
This official stance suggests that while Somaliland remains open to dialogue, it recognizes the reality that Somalia’s current state makes meaningful negotiations virtually impossible.
The Moment of Truth
President Cirro’s Qatar visit will be measured not by ceremonial gestures, but by tangible outcomes. If Qatar genuinely recognizes Somaliland’s strategic value and offers meaningful political support, this could mark a historic breakthrough.
However, if the invitation masks an attempt to resurrect failed unity talks under Qatari mediation, it may represent one of the most perilous diplomatic challenges Somaliland has navigated in over three decades.
The question is no longer what Qatar wants with Somaliland—it’s whether Somaliland can get what it needs from Qatar without getting dragged back into the cesspool that has consumed Somalia for generations. The stakes could not be higher, and the margin for error has never been smaller.
The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland will launch a report to mark the 65th anniversary of Somaliland’s independence and call for the UK Government to recognise it as an independent nation.
The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), chaired by Sir Gavin Williamson, will formally launch its report on Thursday 26th June in the House of Commons. The APPG was formed with the goal of promoting an understanding of and support for Somaliland’s achievements in building peace, democratic governance and a sovereign state in the Horn of Africa. It is chaired by the Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP, with Kim Johnson MP as co-chair, Abtisam Mohamed MP as vice chair and Lord Udny-Lister as an officer.
The APPG’s report, entitled “Roadmap to Recognition” argues that the UK should recognise Somaliland for economic, strategic, and moral reasons, and underlines Somaliland’s potential to be a key democratic partner in what is a volatile yet geopolitically significant region.
In particular, the report highlights the leading role the UK should play in recognising Somaliland, considering its deep historical ties with the country, the presence of a large Somaliland diaspora in the UK, and the UK’s role as UN penholder for Somalia.
The report also proposes the establishment of an “Independence Institution” to provide the government with independent and technical advice; ideas for and the development of government policy; and overarching implementation of government-agreed policy and initiatives.
Sir Gavin said: “In a world that is becoming more unpredictable and unstable, the United Kingdom needs all the friends and allies it can get. Somaliland has built a stable and democratic society against all the odds, and is a bastion of good governance in an otherwise volatile region.
Not only would recognising Somaliland grant the UK an immense strategic advantage in the Horn of Africa, but it would also open up new commercial opportunities and new markets. Moreover, recognising Somaliland’s efforts to promote democratic governance would send a strong signal to other developing nations.
Somaliland deserved recognition when it re-established its independence from Somalia in 1991. The next best time to recognise Somaliland is now.”
China’s growing dominance in Africa is rarely overt. Instead of military bases or flag waving infrastructure inaugurations, it proceeds quietly through economic encroachment and strategic debt. This is China’s “silent conquest” of Africa.
Although in the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka offers the most vivid warning. In 2017, unable to repay a billion-dollar Chinese loan, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to lease Hambantota Port and adjacent lands to a Chinese state enterprise for 99 years. This was not simply a financial deal; it was the ceding of sovereign territory with latent military implications. In Africa, similar patterns are emerging with alarming frequency.
Zambia’s debt to China has surpassed six billion dollars. Concerns have mounted that ZESCO, the national electricity utility, may be collateralized in the event of default. Leaked documents and stalled audits reinforce fears of strategic asset forfeiture. In Nigeria, over five billion dollars in Chinese loans have funded critical infrastructure under agreements that often bypass the nation’s legal syatem, granting China considerable leverage in the event of disputes. These clauses are opaque and rarely debated in public forums. Civil society and lawmakers are rightfully worried that national autonomy is being sold off in increments.
In Somalia, Chinese support for road construction and urban development is intertwined with limited public transparency and weak institutional oversight. Chinese influence in Mogadishu, closely aligned with that of Turkey, has formed an axis of external control in a state that cannot meet its own security or budgetary needs. Allegations of unexplained wealth surrounding President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his inner circle further illustrate the risks of unchecked foreign entanglements.
China’s political leverage was also evident in Somalia’s decision to ban Taiwanese citizens from entering Somaliland’s airspace—a move widely viewed as Chinese effort to undermine the burgeoning relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. The move was met with condemnation from the United States, which invoked the Taipei Act to register its disapproval. The ban also placed Somalia at odds with democratic donors, jeopardizing development assistance and isolating the country further.
Beijing’s strategy extends beyond bilateral engagements. Its economic influence has translated into political capital within global institutions. In the United Nations General Assembly, the African voting bloc—increasingly indebted to China—often aligns with Beijing on key resolutions, challenging the institution’s ability to uphold democratic values and norms.
To respond to these challenges, the United States must act with precision and principle. America’s strategic interests require deeper, more equitable engagement across the African continent. That includes strengthening the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), not as a vague ambition, but as a defined, funded and continent specific program. In addition, a similar dedicated US Africa initiative could provide a better focused, reliable alternative for infrastructure development, digital ecosystems and credible security partnerships.
Nowhere is this engagement more urgent than in the Horn of Africa, and no country in the region offers the US a clearer opportunity than the Republic of Somaliland. A politically stable and democratically governed country that occupies a geostrategic position of vital importance. It lies along the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a maritime route through which nearly 10 percent of global trade flows. Its location alone makes it a valuable partner in ensuring freedom of navigation and countering authoritarian expansion.
Equally important, Somaliland is rich in untapped hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals, including gold, lithium, copper and silver. Although unrecognized, it holds regular multiparty elections and has maintained internal stability for over three decades. Somaliland also fulfills the universally accepted criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention in that it has a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The former British protectorate gained independence on June 26, 1960 and was recognized by the international community. Its subsequent union with Somalia was never ratified, violating Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. After years of violence, genocide and state collapse, Somaliland reclaimed its independence in 1991. A 2001 national referendum reaffirmed that decision.
For the US, formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty could represent a diplomatic masterstroke, a strategic pivot in offsetting China’s influence across Africa. A strong US-Somaliland relationship would provide a vital counterweight to Beijing’s growing presence in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the region. It would also create a base of democratic cooperation along one of the world’s most strategic and sensitive shipping corridors. Recognition would also signal America’s commitment to rewarding democratic governance and stability. Somaliland has held regular multiparty elections for over three decades and maintained internal peace in one of the world’s most volatile regions. It offers the United States an opportunity to support a self-reliant, democratic partner rather than an aid-dependent state vulnerable to external manipulation.
China’s expanding presence in Africa is not unstoppable. Across the continent, reformers, civil society groups and citizens are pushing back, demanding accountability, transparency and genuine partnership. Africa does not need tokenism or symbolic engagement, but a credible alternative to China’s debt driven model.
If the United States is to reclaim its relevance in Africa, it must bring vision and commitment to the table. The defining measure of great influence in the coming decades will not be hard power or military engagement, which undermines both economic progress and political stability, but rather the policies and partnerships each of these two major contenders has to offer Africa. A principled US-Somaliland relationship, grounded on democratic values and mutual respect, would be a credible and enduring place to begin.
In this context, Congressman Scott Perry’s introduction of the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act in the United States House of Representatives represents a timely and strategic development. It affirms that recognition of Somaliland is not only morally sound and legally justified, but also fully aligned with the national interests of the United States. The proposed legislation offers a clear and credible congressional pathway toward formal diplomatic recognition and merits broad bipartisan support.
This moment also presents a strategic opportunity for Somaliland’s close partner, the Republic of China (Taiwan), to discreetly lobby the 229 member Congressional Taiwan Caucus, the largest caucus in the U.S. Congress, in support of the bill.
For its part, the Republic of Somaliland must launch a focused public diplomacy and media outreach campaign in Washington to build the necessary momentum and ensure the legislation gains meaningful traction.
About the Author
Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal currently serves as the Republic of Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan. A seasoned diplomat and politician with extensive experience in African and Asian geopolitics. Ambassador Galaal has held multiple senior government positions,
including Ambassador to Ethiopia, State Minister for Planning and National Development, and State Minister for Health. He has represented Somaliland in high-level negotiations across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and is widely recognised for his expertise in regional security and development strategy. His work draws on a strong background in law, governance, public policy, and international advocacy.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Central Bank delegation secures foundational partnership with Taiwan and technical support from African counterparts at International Association of Deposit Insurers conference
A delegation from the Central Bank of the Republic of Somaliland, led by Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre has secured critical partnerships to establish a national deposit insurance system, a foundational step toward strengthening the country’s banking sector. The progress was made at the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) Africa Regional Committee conference, held in Mombasa, Kenya, from June 16-19, 2025.
The event, co-hosted by the Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), focused on building resilient financial safety nets across the continent. For the Somaliland team, the objective was clear: learn from established systems and forge the alliances needed to build its own.
“Confidence in banking begins with trust—and trust begins with strong institutions like deposit insurance,” said Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre, who led the Somaliland delegation. “This forum brought together Africa’s financial safety net leaders to tackle the big questions: how to prepare for crisis before it strikes, and how to protect depositors with confidence.”
A Foundational Partnership with Taiwan
The most significant outcome was a bilateral meeting between Deputy Chairman Khayre and Ms. Yvonne Fan, an IADI Board member and Executive Vice President of Taiwan’s Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). The discussion focused on direct collaboration to create a Deposit Insurance Unit within Somaliland’s Central Bank.
“Meeting with Taiwan’s CDIC Executive Vice President Yvonne Fan was a turning point in our journey to establish a unit that protects our people’s savings,” Khayre stated, emphasizing the breakthrough.
This financial collaboration deepens the existing relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. “The shared values between Taiwan and Somaliland continue to open new pathways, not only in diplomacy but also in financial sector development,” Khayre noted.
The delegation also held productive sessions with deposit insurance agencies from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Namibia, and Turkey to discuss best practices and potential technical support.
“We are not starting from scratch,” Khayre reflected. “With the right partners, Somaliland can design a deposit insurance system that is both homegrown and globally respected.”
“From Ghana to Namibia, South Africa to Turkey — every meeting was a reminder that financial resilience is not built in isolation, but through shared experiences and mutual support,” he added.
Why Deposit Insurance Matters for Somaliland
Establishing a deposit insurance system is a core part of the Central Bank’s strategy to modernize Somaliland’s financial architecture. For an emerging economy, such a system encourages citizens to move their savings from informal methods into the regulated banking system, providing banks with a stable capital base for lending and investment. The psychological impact cannot be understated – when people trust that their deposits are protected, they participate more actively in the formal financial system.
The global standard-bearer remains the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), established in 1933 following the Great Depression. The FDIC’s guarantee of deposits up to $250,000 per account has virtually eliminated bank runs in America for over nine decades. When Americans see the “FDIC Insured” sign, they know their money is safe regardless of economic turbulence. This confidence translates directly into economic stability and growth.
For Somaliland, the need is particularly acute given the territory’s unique position. Its lack of formal international recognition creates barriers that force reliance on traditional hawala money transfer systems for international transactions. These networks, while historically important, typically charge fees of 8-15% compared to the 1-3% seen in standard international banking. Building robust, internationally recognized financial frameworks represents a pathway toward overcoming these barriers and reducing transaction costs for citizens and businesses.
The territory has seen significant growth in mobile payment systems, with services like ZAAD and eDahab becoming widely adopted. However, these innovations exist alongside regulatory challenges that the Central Bank continues to address as part of its broader modernization efforts.
The Somaliland delegation included Mohamed Abdullahi Ali (Director, Financial Institutions Supervision), Abshir Abdi Mohamed (Director, Monetary Policy), and Mahmoud (Senior Advisor, Bank Deposit Insurance). Their participation reflects a targeted effort under the leadership of Central Bank Governor Abdinasir Ahmed Hirsi to implement comprehensive financial reforms.
“Deposit insurance isn’t just a policy—it’s a promise. And Somaliland is preparing to make that promise to its people,” Khayre declared.
As the delegation returns to Hargeisa, the focus will shift from diplomacy to policy implementation. The partnerships forged in Mombasa provide a roadmap for a system that could strengthen Somaliland’s banking sector while building the institutional credibility needed for broader economic development.
Ambassador Riley’s diplomatic mission signals Washington’s growing interest in direct engagement
Key Points
U.S. Ambassador Riley led a rare full-team visit to Hargeisa, signaling deepening ties.
Washington is reviewing its One-Somalia policy and considering a diplomatic office in Somaliland.
Media misreported visit as military-related—no U.S. military officials were present.
Berbera featured prominently in talks amid growing U.S. interest in regional security.
Somaliland Presidency and Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the visit.
HARGEISA – In a visit described by insiders as anything but routine, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley brought his full senior team to Hargeisa this week for closed-door meetings with Somaliland’s leadership. The high-level delegation included Deputy Chief of Mission Steven Gillen and senior Political, Economic, and Military Affairs officers—essentially the entire top brass of the US mission to Somalia. After spending the night in Hargeisa, the group flew to Berbera the next morning. No public statements were issued by either side.
“This wasn’t a courtesy call,” said one Somaliland government source, speaking on condition of anonymity. “When the entire embassy leadership comes and stays the night, something significant is happening.”
Multiple sources confirmed to the Chronicle that Washington is quietly reassessing its decades-old One-Somalia policy—a diplomatic framework that treats Somalia as a single territorial entity and has long precluded formal US engagement with Somaliland. Officials are now weighing the possibility of opening a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, akin to the UK’s arrangement, as part of a shift toward what sources describe as a “reality-based approach.”
For decades, the One-Somalia policy has served as the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa. Under this framework, the United States has recognized the sovereignty of Somalia as a unified state, avoiding any bilateral dealings with Somaliland to avoid legitimizing its independence claim. The approach has long frustrated Somaliland officials, who argue that their democratic governance and relative stability warrant separate recognition.
This would mark a clear departure from the approach of previous ambassadors—such as Donald Yamamoto and Larry André—whom a retired U.S. official described as “more Catholic than the Pope” in their rigid adherence to Mogadishu-centric diplomacy.
Ambassador Riley, a 30-year career diplomat who assumed his post almost a year ago, appears to be charting a new course. His decision to bring the full embassy leadership signals that the discussions were treated as a strategic priority. The visit also comes just days ahead of AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s expected trip to Somaliland—his final stop before stepping down—a move that adds military weight to the evolving relationship.
Although some media outlets rushed to frame the visit as AFRICOM-centric—fueled by social media clips of V-22 Osprey helicopters hovering over Berbera—there were no U.S. military officials present in this delegation. The coverage largely missed the fact that this was a full-spectrum diplomatic mission led by Ambassador Riley, not a defense-driven operation. The real story was in Hargeisa, behind closed doors.
“The Americans are clearly interested in more than development assistance,” said a second source familiar with the talks. “Berbera came up repeatedly.”
Berbera Port, now operated by DP World, has grown into a strategic logistics hub serving Ethiopia’s trade and sitting along critical Red Sea shipping lanes—where Chinese influence has surged. Defense analysts have identified it as a prime location for projecting U.S. power in the region and countering emerging threats.
Details of the Hargeisa meetings with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” and his senior team remain closely guarded. A Somaliland official would only describe the discussions as “seeking engagement in areas of mutual interest”—a diplomatic phrase that has done little to quell speculation.
That speculation has only intensified following public statements by Somaliland officials expressing openness to hosting U.S. forces. Sources suggest the talks included discussion of long-term military and strategic cooperation, potentially including a U.S. presence in Berbera.
The shift in U.S. posture comes amid signs of growing frustration with Somalia’s federal government. In recent months, Somalia has pivoted to China and Washington has significantly slashed funding particularly in the security sector, imposed new travel restrictions on Somali travellers, and quietly scaled down its presence in Mogadishu due to persistent security and governance concerns. These moves reflect what some analysts see as a broader recalibration of U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.
In what may be a further sign of deepening engagement, sources indicate that President Cirro is preparing for an official visit to the United States, although the timeline remains unclear. While Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Washington just last month—meeting with multiple U.S. legislators including Ted Cruz of Texas and Scott Perry—there is still no confirmation on which figures from President Trump’s adminstration in State or Defense the Somaliland delegation might engage.
The contrast in diplomatic posture is becoming impossible to ignore. For decades, the U.S. has funneled aid and engagement through federal institutions in Mogadishu. Now, Riley’s direct outreach to Hargeisa—backed by possible military coordination—signals a break with that status quo.
“They’re talking about something more permanent,” one source said, referring to the proposed diplomatic presence. Privately, some U.S. officials describe the idea of Somali unity as a “fiction,” and see Somaliland as a functional, stable partner worth engaging on its own terms.
Recent shifts in American policy—reduced aid flows, travel restrictions, and a more restrained presence in Mogadishu—have further highlighted the growing appeal of Somaliland’s relative stability and functioning institutions.
Somaliland’s foreign ministry did not respond to multiple requests for comment. The Office of the President also declined to engage, despite repeated inquiries. The silence from both institutions has only fueled speculation about the depth and direction of this new chapter in US-Somaliland relations.
The upcoming visit by General Langley may serve as a litmus test for whether defense cooperation will form a pillar of this emerging relationship. If the military angle takes shape, it would represent not just a diplomatic shift—but a significant recalibration of American strategic posture in the Horn of Africa.
After thirty years of wishful thinking in Mogadishu, Washington may finally be ready to deal with the Horn’s realities—not its illusions.
HARGEISA — Less than three years after this publication exposed the former Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali for flaunting an “honorary doctorate” from a Delaware-based diploma mill that shares an address with a tile supplier, yet another high-ranking official has been caught in an almost identical act of deception.
Munir Ahmed Egal, the Director General of the Presidency — the administrative engine behind the nation’s highest office — received a graduate degree from Bircham International University, an unaccredited institution repeatedly flagged by international education authorities for selling degrees without any meaningful academic requirements.
A Serial Pattern of Deception
This is not an isolated incident. In August 2022, Somaliland Chronicle revealed that Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali had proudly accepted an “Honorary Doctorate” from European Digital University — a university in name only, operating out of an office in Delaware with no academic standing or accreditation. That scandal was met with shrugs and silence from the very institutions tasked with protecting public integrity.
Instead of confronting the problem, the government appears to have normalized it. Now, just a few years later, an even more egregious example has surfaced — one that reaches the core of the executive branch. Egal’s fake degree isn’t honorary. It was purchased.
Gullible or Dishonest? Either Way, Unfit to Serve
Whether Egal knowingly purchased a fraudulent credential or was duped by Bircham’s elaborate marketing is beside the point. If he was complicit, he has committed fraud. If he was fooled, he lacks the discernment and judgment required for high office. Both scenarios disqualify him.
This isn’t a minor resume embellishment. It’s a question of integrity and competence in one of the most sensitive government roles in Somaliland.
A Government of Ghost Degrees
A source involved in the 2021 parliamentary and local council elections told Somaliland Chronicle that document forgery has become an entrenched part of Somaliland politics. He described a thriving underground market for fake degrees and transcripts, openly catering to political hopefuls desperate to meet basic eligibility requirements or appear more educated than they are.
“It became a seasonal business,” he said. “Election season meant peak sales.”
Legitimate degree holders now find themselves competing against officials who simply paid to appear qualified. And the consequences aren’t academic — they’re structural. Policy decisions, financial oversight, and foreign diplomacy are now being handled by people whose credentials collapse under the weight of a Google search.
Bircham: A Sophisticated Diploma Mill Operation
Bircham International University represents the modern evolution of academic fraud — a sophisticated operation that has successfully deceived officials worldwide for over three decades. Founded in 1992 by Deric Bircham, William Martin, and Bircham’s adopted son Laurence Cheng Wen, the institution has operated from multiple jurisdictions including the Bahamas, Delaware, and Spain, frequently moving when scrutinized by authorities.
The founders present themselves with grandiose credentials. William Martin claims knighthood in the “Order of the Commonwealth” and “Order of Saint Andrew of Jerusalem,” while Deric Bircham boasts of receiving “countless nominations and honors” and claims ancestral ties to medieval English nobility. Their promotional materials feature dramatic narratives about aristocratic Spanish families and connections to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
Despite these elaborate backstories, the reality is stark. Oregon education officials called Bircham “totally bogus” in 2003. Texas Higher Education authorities determined it has “no degree-granting authority from Spain.” Mexico, Kenya, and multiple U.S. states have issued warnings against the institution.
Among the fake credentials Bircham cites:
AAHEA — The “American Association for Higher Education and Accreditation” appears on Wikipedia’s list of unrecognized accreditors (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unrecognized_higher_education_accreditation_organizations). The real AAHEA was disbanded in 2009, but this Florida-based organization appropriated the name and Washington DC phone number to create false legitimacy. Neither the U.S. Department of Education nor the Council for Higher Education Accreditation recognizes this AAHEA as a legitimate accreditor.
Curaçao Charter — In 2018, Bircham secured a so-called “charter” from Curaçao, a jurisdiction that markets itself as offering “transnational education” opportunities with minimal oversight. The territory explicitly states it “does not provide accreditation” but merely grants charters to institutions that promise to seek accreditation elsewhere.
Professional Memberships — Bircham lists affiliations with IEEE, UN PRME, and other organizations that offer open membership to individuals. These memberships are meaningless in the context of institutional legitimacy.
IARC — The International Accreditation and Recognition Council appears on lists of unrecognized accreditors used by diploma mills and is not recognized by any major educational authority.
Bircham International University’s website touts its status as a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit in the United States, a designation typically associated with charitable or educational institutions. But this claim is deeply misleading. The IRS grants 501(c)(3) status based on tax-exemption criteria, not academic legitimacy. It does not — and never has — evaluated whether an organization offers real education, issues valid degrees, or even operates as a school in any meaningful sense.
This maneuver is common among diploma mills: masquerade as a nonprofit to gain credibility, avoid taxes, and mislead prospective students with a veneer of official recognition. In Bircham’s case, the 501(c)(3) badge is little more than decorative — a shield for a for-profit operation that sells degrees dressed up as academic achievement. In short: tax-exempt, but not legitimate.
The “Non-Formal” Education Smokescreen
Bircham’s own website reveals the elaborate legal architecture designed to avoid educational oversight while maintaining the pretense of academic legitimacy. In a telling admission of regulatory gamesmanship, the institution explicitly states it operates under Spain’s “non-formal” education framework — a classification designed for vocational training, cooking classes, and professional workshops, not university-level education. This loophole allows Bircham to avoid supervision by Spain’s Ministry of Education while still calling itself a “university.” The institution proudly declares it is “exempt from direct regulation by any Ministry of Education, as a non formal education provider” — essentially admitting it operates outside legitimate educational oversight while marketing itself as an institution of higher learning.
This regulatory arbitrage represents sophisticated institutional fraud. Rather than submitting to educational authorities who would evaluate academic standards, curricula, and faculty qualifications, Bircham has structured itself under the Ministry of Economy (business registration) and Ministry of Consumer Affairs (business oversight) — treating education as a commercial product rather than an academic discipline. In the United States, Bircham’s Delaware incorporation as a 501c3 nonprofit provides no educational validation whatsoever; it simply means they’ve filed paperwork claiming charitable status. The institution even fabricates oversight by citing “IVU, Ignita Veritas United” and “Magna Carta Bar Chambers” as supervisory bodies — grandiose names for what appear to be fictional organizations designed to create an illusion of legitimate governance. This isn’t regulatory compliance; it’s regulatory theater designed to fool those unfamiliar with real educational accreditation.
A Career Built on Connections, Not Credentials
Egal’s fraudulent degree is merely the latest chapter in a career propelled by political proximity rather than merit. His rise through Somaliland’s institutions illustrates how access to power routinely trumps qualifications in high-stakes appointments.
During the Siilaanyo administration, Egal was inexplicably appointed as European correspondent for Somaliland National TV—despite lacking any background in journalism. The post included travel on sensitive diplomatic missions, including the Somaliland–Somalia talks in Turkey. Colleagues at the national broadcaster openly questioned how someone without journalistic or diplomatic credentials landed such a role.
Those doubts proved well-founded.
After Siilaanyo left office, Egal resurfaced within the Waddani opposition, launching the Somaliland Today outlet and once again assuming a media leadership role—still without addressing long-standing concerns about his qualifications.
Now, under President Abdirahman Abdillahi, Egal occupies the powerful post of Director General of the Presidency, responsible for coordinating the operations of Somaliland’s highest executive office. Yet he brings no evident administrative experience or record of institutional management.
His ascent—despite a persistent lack of competence—underscores a deeper structural failure: in Somaliland politics, loyalty and access continue to eclipse expertise and vetting.
Presidential Complicity? A Devastating Confession
Perhaps the most explosive evidence comes from Egal himself. In a testimonial on Bircham’s website, he proudly details his fraudulent journey while revealing potential high-level government complicity. Writing under “Somalia” rather than Somaliland — effectively erasing the nation he claims to serve — Egal describes attending Bircham’s Miami ceremony in 2025.
Most shocking is his claim that President Abdirahman Abdillahi personally “encouraged me during those hard times to continue completing my studies.” This raises explosive questions: Did the President know Egal was pursuing an unaccredited degree? Is this why such officials feel emboldened to obtain fake credentials?
Egal’s gratitude extends to “the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of Staff, the Presidential Spokesperson, and all the various leaders at the Presidency of Somaliland,” suggesting widespread knowledge of his academic pursuits within the government. His public thanks to businessman Mr. Abdirashid Duale, the CEO Dahabshil conglomerate raises further questions about who financed this fraudulent education.
The testimonial concludes with quotes from Nelson Mandela and Somali poetry — a grotesque appropriation of moral authority to validate academic fraud.
Ceremony for Sale: The Commercial Theater
Bircham’s graduation ceremonies reveal the commercial nature of this operation. The institution charges hefty fees for elaborate staged ceremonies designed to create the illusion of academic legitimacy. According to its graduation protocol (https://bircham.net/biu-graduates/ceremonies/), “formal ceremonies” cost $300-500 per graduate, while “photo sessions” range from $200-300. The protocol explicitly states these fees cover “contribution to trip expenses” — essentially charging graduates to fund executives’ international travel.
Recent ceremonies have been held in Qatar, Angola, Guatemala, and El Salvador — mostly in luxury hotels, not universities. The institution even offers “virtual graduation” where students can create fake graduation photos using provided backgrounds and purchase caps and gowns ($150-500) to stage their own ceremonies.
Most tellingly, the graduation documents “do not specify distance education” — deliberately designed to obscure the institution’s unaccredited status.
This is a Global Problem With Real Consequences
Fake degree scandals have toppled officials worldwide. In 2005, the United Nations fired Jonathan Blankson, chief of the Human Resources Information Technology Section, after discovering his degrees were purchased from Trinity College and University, a known diploma mill. A 2004 U.S. Government Accountability Office investigation exposed 350 federal employees with fake degrees from over 120 fraudulent universities, including high-ranking officials like Charles Abell, principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, and Daniel Matthews, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Transportation.
In Mexico, 22 federal health officials were arrested in 2010 after their medical and psychology licenses turned out to be fake, including the technical director of the National Center for Blood Transfusions. According to FBI investigations, the fake degree industry generates over $1 billion annually, with an estimated 200,000 fraudulent diplomas sold each year.
The Vetting Crisis No One Wants to Fix
The bigger scandal is not that another official has a fake degree. It’s that no one in government thought to check. How did someone with such credentials pass through vetting for one of the most sensitive positions in Somaliland? Was his degree listed in his personnel file? Was it paid for with public funds?
This is not a paperwork error. It’s a failure of political culture.
No Response From Officials
Somaliland Chronicle reached out to both Munir Ahmed Egal and the Minister of the Presidency for comment on this story. We specifically asked Mr. Egal to confirm his educational credentials and explain his testimonial praising Bircham International University, while requesting the Minister — as Egal’s direct supervisor — to clarify what role he played in supporting these studies and whether he was aware of the institution’s unaccredited status. Despite multiple attempts to contact both officials through official channels, neither responded to our inquiries. Their silence speaks volumes in a matter that goes to the heart of government integrity and public accountability.
No Excuses in the Age of Search Engines
Anyone with an internet connection can uncover Bircham’s track record in seconds. If Egal and his peers couldn’t bother to do the most basic due diligence on their own education, how can they be trusted to manage national policy?
Ignorance is no longer a defense. The era of plausible deniability ended when search engines were invented.
The Ball is in President Abdillahi’s Court
This is the first major credibility crisis of the new administration. How President Abdillahi responds will define his leadership. Will he investigate, audit, and clean house? Or will he excuse, ignore, and protect?
According to Egal’s own testimonial, the President encouraged these studies. This raises questions about whether the administration was complicit or simply negligent. Either scenario demands immediate action.
The people who voted for transparency deserve more than silence. They deserve to know who’s leading their government — and whether those people actually earned the titles on their business cards.
One Fraud is an Accident. Two is a Pattern. What’s Next?
The Egal case is the second major fake degree scandal Somaliland Chronicle has reported in three years. The first was ignored. The second is unfolding. What happens next will either stop the rot or confirm it runs deeper than anyone imagined.
When fake credentials become an open secret in government, the very idea of merit-based service collapses. Competent, qualified professionals are pushed aside for smooth-talking frauds who know which websites sell prestige by the pound.
The damage is real. Civil servants take cues from the top. If dishonesty is rewarded with promotion, expect more dishonesty. If fake degrees are ignored, expect more fakes.
Got a tip about fake degrees or fraudulent qualifications in public office? Contact our newsroom securely and confidentially. We follow the truth, wherever it leads.
