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National Election Commission Announced Nine-Month Delay of Presidential Elections

September 25, 2022

In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.

Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.

NEC Spokesperson
Abdiaziz Hersi Warsame pic.twitter.com/eKfcTTGD3D
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022

The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.

The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.

The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.

President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.

Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.

The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.

Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.

Dishonest Broker – Why Turkey Will Not Run Somaliland – Somalia Talks

Staff

February 23, 2019

On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.

In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.

Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi

Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.

The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.

Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa

It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.

According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.

Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.

To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.

President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed

Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?

Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.

Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?

Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.

Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?

Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.

As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:

Turkey in Somalia

Security Influence

Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.

The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.

Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.

The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.

Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.

Somalian soldiers are undergoing military training in Turkey. 🇹🇷🇸🇴 @TC_Mogadishu pic.twitter.com/27PKEs80Ln
— Merhaba Afrika (@merhabafrika) January 2, 2019

While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.

According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.

Economic Influence

Since September 21, 2014 Albayrak Group has been operating the Mogadishu Port on a 20 year concession where the company takes 45% of all revenues from the port.

Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.

Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.

Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.

Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.

Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.

Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.

Image result for erdogan visits mogadishu — Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.

According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.

Despite the obvious economic gains Turkey is making in Somalia, it is gearing up to do even more business in that war-torn country.

Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.

Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.

One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.

Turkey in Somaliland

The most visible contribution of Turkey to Somaliland is a recent 216 medical machines donated by TIKA, the Turkish aid agency to Hargeisa Group Hospital.

Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.

There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.

One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.

No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.

Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.

Image result for somaliland dpworld signing — President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem

The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.

Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.

Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.

SOMALIA’S E-VISA SCAM: Leaked Report Confirms $288k in Overcharges—U.S. Embassy In Somalia Now Warns of Breach

Staff

November 13, 2025

U.S. government confirms the data breach: 2,298 American citizens among 35,000 compromised, endangering U.S. lives. Confidential report reveals Mogadishu built a payment system designed to steal, with contractual terms forbidding refunds.

The United States Embassy in Somalia has officially confirmed Somalia’s e-visa system suffered a catastrophic breach exposing the personal data of at least 35,000 people, including 2,298 U.S. citizens whose passport details, photos, and travel patterns are now accessible to anyone with an internet connection—including al-Shabaab.

In a November 13 security alert, the U.S. Embassy warned American citizens that “multiple sources reported credible allegations that unidentified hackers penetrated Somalia’s e-visa system potentially exposing the personal data of at least 35,000 people, including possibly thousands of U.S. citizens.” The leaked data includes visa applicants’ names, photos, dates and places of birth, email addresses, marital status, and home addresses.

A confidential security report obtained by Somaliland Chronicle reveals the breach goes far beyond data exposure. The internal report, classified “CONFIDENTIAL – GOVERNMENT ONLY” and dated October 2025, documents how Mogadishu fraudulently overcharged travelers $287,808 while its public-facing terms of service contractually forbid victims from claiming refunds or initiating chargebacks.

The breach exposed 125,000+ visa applications, sensitive banking information, system-level administrator passwords, and 12,413 payment transactions totaling $794,432. The report’s findings, combined with Somalia’s official e-visa website terms, reveal a payment system designed for theft.

2,298 Americans on a Terrorist Kill List

As Chronicle reported on November 11, the breach created a terrorist targeting database. Complete travel records—passport details, photos, email addresses, and movement patterns—of 35,000 international travelers were fully accessible to anyone on the internet for weeks. Among them: 2,298 American citizens.

The breakdown of exposed nationalities reads like a directory of Western targets in a country where al-Shabaab has spent two decades killing foreigners. Kenya leads with 13,325 passport records exposed, followed by the United Kingdom with 3,027, and the United States with 2,298. The Netherlands accounts for 2,040 exposed records, Colombia 1,686, Sweden 1,679, Norway 1,058, and Canada 972. India, Finland, Ethiopia, Uganda, Pakistan, Denmark, Turkey, and Belgium each lost hundreds to thousands of passport records to the breach.

The confidential report warns that “these individuals’ travel patterns, passport details, photos, and contact information were fully accessible. This creates significant operational security risks for international personnel working in Somalia.”

SOMALIA_EVISA_EXECUTIVE_REPORT Download

How many of the 2,298 compromised Americans were traveling on official business remains unknown. The U.S. Embassy’s November 13 alert acknowledges it is “unable to confirm whether an individual’s data is part of the breach” but advises all e-visa applicants to assume they are compromised. The Somali government has yet to issue a public statement or notify victims.

The Payment Fraud: $288k Stolen, Zero Recourse

The internal report confirms the payment system levied $287,808 in duplicate charges against 1,519 customers, with some paying $256 for a $64 visa. Customers paid once. The system charged them again. And again. And again. Some were billed four times for a single visa. No verification. No fraud detection. No refunds.

The official “Terms & Conditions” on the evisa.gov.so portal ensure this fraud is permanent. The terms state: “…the application fee paid by the applicant is non-refundable under any circumstances.” Furthermore, the government explicitly blocks victims from asking their banks for help: “Payments made by credit, debit, or prepaid cards… cannot be reversed or recovered through chargeback procedures.”

The report reveals the system processed 12,413 transactions totaling $794,432—all without once verifying payments with Mastercard. The system didn’t check if transactions succeeded. The report notes: “System doesn’t verify with Mastercard.” Mogadishu built a billing system that doesn’t confirm whether it already took your money.

How many of those 1,519 victims were Americans? How many of the 2,298 exposed U.S. passport holders were among those fraudulently overcharged? The report doesn’t say. The Somali government hasn’t investigated. The U.S. Embassy’s security alert makes no mention of the financial theft—only the data exposure.

608 ‘Rapid-Fire’ Transactions: The Smoking Gun

The report identifies 608 suspicious “rapid-fire” transactions—payments processed in such rapid succession that they could only have been system-generated duplicates or automated fraud. Yet the system had no payment verification, no fraud detection monitoring, and no rate limiting to prevent rapid duplicate charges. The report categorizes the financial risk as “HIGH” and notes the system lacked “monitoring for suspicious transactions.”

The pattern repeats: payment IDs charged three to four times instead of once, customers paying $192-$256 instead of the standard $64 fee, and zero verification that transactions were legitimate government visa payments. The payment processor—Mastercard Payment Gateway Services—was effectively bypassed. Transactions weren’t categorized as official government visa fees but processed as generic service charges, stripping away consumer protections and making chargebacks contractually impossible.

Mastercard’s $288k Problem

The confidential report identifies the payment processor as “Mastercard Payment Gateway Services (MPGS)”—the same Mastercard that advertises “Zero Liability Protection” for cardholders and operates extensive fraud monitoring programs for merchants. Yet Mogadishu’s e-visa system processed $287,808 in fraudulent duplicate charges under Mastercard’s watch, with 608 suspicious “rapid-fire” transactions that should have triggered fraud alerts.

Mastercard’s own merchant rules require payment processors to monitor for excessive chargebacks and fraudulent transaction patterns. The company operates an “Excessive Fraud Merchant” program that places merchants into monitoring if they process more than $50,000 in fraud chargebacks. Somalia’s e-visa system exceeded that threshold nearly sixfold in duplicate charges alone.

Under standard card network rules, merchants bear liability for “card-not-present” transactions—the kind processed through the e-visa portal. When fraud occurs, the merchant is responsible for refunds, and their acquiring bank can impose fees, raise rates, or shut down accounts. But Somalia’s Terms & Conditions explicitly forbid refunds and chargebacks, creating a contractual trap that undermines card network consumer protections.

Did Mastercard conduct due diligence before allowing a foreign government with no functional financial oversight to process hundreds of thousands of dollars through its network? Did it review Somalia’s “no refund, no chargeback” terms? Did it notice when the same payment IDs were charged three and four times in rapid succession?

Mastercard’s “Zero Liability Protection” promises cardholders won’t be held responsible for unauthorized transactions. But the protection becomes meaningless when the payment processor enables a merchant to contractually block the dispute process. The 1,519 victims can’t invoke Zero Liability Protection because Somalia’s terms preemptively forbid the chargeback mechanism.

Mastercard has settled merchant fraud liability disputes before—most recently for $199.5 million in 2024 over improper liability shifts to merchants. The company now faces questions about whether it bears responsibility for facilitating fraud by a government merchant that openly advertised its refusal to honor basic consumer protections. Every one of those $287,808 in fraudulent charges generated processing fees for Mastercard.

A “Sovereign” System on a Shared Florida Server

The report confirms Somalia’s entire sovereign immigration database is not located in Somalia. Mogadishu hosts it on a shared cPanel server physically located in Tampa, Florida, operated by Liquid Web, L.L.C., based in Lansing, Michigan. The hosting environment is shared, meaning multiple unrelated websites occupy the same physical server.

By choosing US-based shared hosting, the Somali government has violated its own Data Protection Act, which governs cross-border transfer of citizens’ data. Somalia’s most sensitive immigration records—including those 2,298 American passport holders—are now subject to U.S. legal jurisdiction. A review of the e-visa portal finds no Privacy Policy. American travelers, UN officials, and UK diplomats who used the system were never informed that their data—including passport scans, biometric photos, and travel itineraries—would be stored, unsecured, on a shared server in Tampa.

Total System Compromise: Passwords Published Online

The report confirms the system’s database passwords were “publicly accessible to anyone on the internet” and that visa records could be accessed by “simply changing numbers in the web address”—no login, no authentication, no security. The system used sequential numbering for visa applications, meaning anyone could access the entire database by incrementing a single digit in a URL.

The report identifies five critical vulnerabilities: system files publicly accessible, unrestricted file upload allowing malicious code execution, missing access controls on visa records, payment system vulnerabilities resulting in $287,808 in duplicate charges, and weak authentication on administrative accounts. Each vulnerability is rated “CRITICAL” except the last, which merits “HIGH.” The system had 73 database tables fully exposed, containing 125,000+ visa applications, 34,000+ passport records, 27,000+ email addresses, 123,000+ phone numbers, 20,000+ biometric photos, and 12,400+ payment transactions.

This digital collapse mirrors a physical one. Staff at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport remain in full work stoppage over unpaid wages and maltreatment by the Turkish firm Favori LLC. The government that cannot pay its airport workers operates an international fraud scheme that has drawn an official warning from the United States government.

Washington Confirms the Breach—But What Can It Do?

The November 13, 2025 U.S. Embassy security alert marks the first official acknowledgment by a Western government of the breach. The alert states: “On November 11, 2025, multiple sources reported credible allegations that unidentified hackers penetrated Somalia’s e-visa system potentially exposing the personal data of at least 35,000 people, including possibly thousands of U.S. citizens.”

The embassy advises American citizens who applied for Somali e-visas to assume their data has been compromised, monitor announcements from the Somali Immigration and Citizenship Agency, and consult Federal Trade Commission resources on data breaches. But the alert is silent on what legal action the United States can take against a foreign government operating a fraudulent data operation on American soil.

Under the CLOUD Act of 2018, U.S. law enforcement has explicit authority to compel U.S.-based technology companies to provide data in their “possession, custody, or control” regardless of where that data is stored. While Somalia is the nominal controller of the e-visa data, the physical servers are operated by Liquid Web, L.L.C., a U.S. company subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The FBI could, in theory, seize the servers, secure the data, and conduct a criminal investigation into the fraud without Somalia’s consent.

Moreover, Executive Order 14117, signed by President Biden in February 2024, explicitly addresses the threat posed when foreign governments store Americans’ “bulk sensitive personal data” on U.S. infrastructure. The order finds that such arrangements pose “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security. While Somalia is not currently designated as a “country of concern” under the order, the exposed data of 2,298 Americans—including potential government personnel—and the demonstrable security failures could trigger Department of Justice review.

The State Department’s Level 4 “Do Not Travel” advisory for Somalia remains in effect due to crime, terrorism, civil unrest, health issues, kidnapping, and piracy. Americans must now add to this list: state-sponsored data theft and financial fraud—hosted on American servers, subject to American law.

The Silence of Western Allies

The United States stands alone in its public acknowledgment of the breach. The United Kingdom, whose 3,027 citizens had their passport data exposed, has issued no public warning. The European Union, which provided technical assistance for Somalia’s digital migration, has remained publicly silent. The Netherlands, with 2,040 compromised passport holders, has said nothing. Sweden, with 1,679 exposed citizens, has offered no alert. Norway, Canada, Australia—all silent.

According to diplomatic sources cited by multiple outlets, embassies in Nairobi are “quietly advising” and “privately warning” citizens to presume their data is compromised. But quiet advice and private warnings do not protect aid workers in Mogadishu or diplomats traveling to Somalia. They do not notify the thousands of Europeans, Canadians, and Australians whose passport photos and travel itineraries are now accessible to al-Shabaab. They do not demand accountability for the $287,808 stolen through fraudulent duplicate charges.

The British Embassy in Mogadishu maintains no public advisory on the breach. The UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office’s travel advice for Somalia warns of terrorism, kidnapping, and piracy but makes no mention of the exposure of British passport data. The EU, having funded Somalia’s digital transformation, has not informed European citizens that their investment produced a terrorist targeting database hosted on a shared server in Florida.

The Questions Washington Must Answer

How many of the 2,298 compromised Americans were traveling on official business? Were U.S. government personnel required to use this system? Has the State Department notified all 2,298 affected American citizens by name? Why was Somalia’s e-visa system certified for use by international travelers without basic security audits?

And critically: will the U.S. government use its legal authority over the Tampa-based servers to seize the data, investigate the fraud, and demand restitution for Americans who were overcharged? Or will it issue security alerts and move on?

Mogadishu quietly replaced the evisa.gov.so portal with a new platform, etas.gov.so, on November 10. The old system redirects users to the new site with no mention of the breach or data exposure. Early analysis suggests the replacement system shares concerning structural similarities with its predecessor. The Somali government has issued no official statement acknowledging the incident, detailing the scope of the compromise, or confirming whether affected individuals have been notified.

The Reckoning

Mogadishu has endangered 2,298 American lives, along with thousands more UN workers, British diplomats, and Western aid personnel, while simultaneously operating a “no-refund” scam to steal their money. The breach exposed 35,000 records from 145 countries. The fraud stole $287,808. The contractual terms ensure victims cannot recover a cent.

And it all happened on American soil, under American jurisdiction, using American infrastructure.

The fiction of a functioning Somali state has cost 35,000 people their security, their privacy, and their money—with official confirmation from Washington that 2,298 Americans are among the victims. The question remains: can the world afford to continue funding a regime that robs and exposes its own allies—including the United States—while operating its criminal enterprise from a server farm in Florida?

Reclaiming Somaliland’s Airspace Through ICAO’s Safety Lens

Staff

November 8, 2025

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) isn’t in the business of picking sides in political fights. It doesn’t hand out recognition like a passport stamp. What it does do—quietly, consistently—is step in when airspace squabbles start threatening planes full of passengers. That’s the opening Somaliland needs to take back practical control of its skies without waiting for the world to agree on its borders.

The trick is to frame the problem as a safety headache, not a sovereignty showdown. Build a dossier of real-world glitches—duplicate NOTAMs, crossed radio calls, botched handoffs—and show that Somalia’s grip on the Mogadishu Flight Information Region (FIR) is putting metal in the air at risk. ICAO has fixed exactly this kind of mess before, in places where the politics are just as radioactive.

Kosovo: Safety Trumps Maps

Take Kosovo. After it declared independence in 2008, Serbia kept firing off NOTAMs for Pristina’s airspace like nothing had changed. Kosovo’s fledgling aviation authority started issuing its own. Pilots flying the Balkan corridors suddenly had two sets of instructions, sometimes flat-out contradictory. One wrong vector and you’re looking at a mid-air.

ICAO didn’t weigh in on who owned the dirt below. It saw a collision risk and, with NATO’s muscle, forced a technical fix. Kosovo proved it could run radar and radios without drama. Within a couple of years, the upper airspace was theirs in every way that mattered to a cockpit crew.

Cyprus: Two Voices, One Sky

Same story in the eastern Med. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot controllers were both shouting headings into the same patch of blue. ICAO brokered a handshake: split the frequencies, clarify the boundaries, keep the politics in the parking lot. The island is still divided, but the jets fly straight.

Somaliland’s Playbook

Somaliland already runs tidy airports—Hargeisa and Berbera aren’t chaos zones. The Civil Aviation and Airports Authority is real; it issues licenses, inspects runways, trains staff. Now it needs to start logging every hiccup that traces back to Mogadishu’s distant hand:

A NOTAM from Somalia that contradicts local weather observations.
A handoff where the pilot hears nothing but static for thirty nerve-racking miles.
Two controllers stepping on each other’s transmissions at FL240.

One solid incident report, properly verified, is enough to knock on ICAO’s door. The ask is simple: “Convene a technical coordination meeting. We can show the current setup is unsafe, and we’re ready to fix it.” No mention of flags or UN seats.

The Homework

Gear up. Modern radios, and radar feeds,—whatever ICAO rules demand.
Document relentlessly. Every near miss, every airline that reroutes to avoid the mess and so on
Invite the neighbors. Ethiopia, and the UAE carriers—get them talking to Hargeisa tower directly. Habit becomes precedent.

Do this right and the shift happens. Airlines don’t care whose anthem plays in the tower; they care that the voice on frequency knows the terrain. Taiwan manages its FIR without a seat at most tables. Kosovo did it. Somaliland can too—one safe handoff at a time.

About the Author

Badri Jimale is Horn of Africa follower and Pragmatic solutions advocate.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are perm

Breaking – Somalia’s E-Visa System Vulnerability: A Digital Nightmare Exposing Travelers to Al-Shabaab

Staff

October 27, 2025

In a chilling revelation that underscores the precarious state of digital security in conflict zones, Somalia’s E-Visa verification system is harboring a catastrophic vulnerability. This flaw exposes the personal data of every foreign national who has applied for a visa, placing them in grave danger from the Al-Shabaab militant group. The vulnerability, found by a security team led by Abdi Daud, Lead Architect and expert in building enterprise systems, resides in the E-Visa’s verification endpoint, which requires no authentication, authorization, or rate limiting. This negligence leaves the system wide open to anyone with an internet connection, transforming a tool of state into a potential directory for terrorists. This isn’t just a data breach; it’s a matter of life and death.

Somaliland Chronicle has independently verified the vulnerability, confirming the urgency and severity of the situation. Mr. Daud explained that this is not a sophisticated hack but a fundamental, negligent architectural failure. “The vulnerability is so basic that it’s almost laughable,” Daud, who spoke on the record, told Somaliland Chronicle. “This isn’t hacking; it’s counting. Somalia’s E-Visa system is like numbering everyone’s visa number and putting them on a website URL. With a little trial and error, anyone can simply change the number in the web address and see the next person’s complete passport details and photograph. I found multiple records in 30 minutes with a script that took 10 minutes to write. In my entire career, I’ve never seen a simpler vulnerability with more catastrophic consequences.”

The consequence of this exposure is a potential death sentence. Al-Shabaab, known for its sophisticated intelligence capabilities and relentless attacks on foreigners, can now exploit this database to target embassy staff, NGO workers, and United Nations personnel. Handing the militant group a digital ‘kill list’ of every foreigner visiting Somalia—complete with photos and passport details—is an open invitation to targeted assassinations and kidnappings. The complete absence of basic security protocols is baffling. Modern API security, standard practice in most countries, was completely overlooked. This system was apparently designed with zero consideration for security, even though it handles the most sensitive data possible: international travel into a high-risk conflict zone.

The threat matrix is vast, extending beyond terrorism to identity theft and espionage, while placing vulnerable groups like children and political dissidents at even greater risk. This level of negligence appears to violate multiple international laws, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For EU citizens, this is a clear violation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has extraterritorial provisions that could trigger significant fines. This failure also flies in the face of U.S. national security policy, such as Executive Order 14117, which seeks to prevent this exact type of data exposure. The incident raises serious questions about contractor liability and the obligations of the hosting providers and payment processors profiting from this compromised system.

Ultimately, this digital collapse mirrors Somalia’s chronic physical governance failures. A recent White House proclamation banning certain Somali officials from the U.S. cited the country’s “lack of command and control of its territory.” That language is prescient. The E-Visa system is the digital echo of this exact failure, extending Somalia’s failed state status into the digital realm. It suggests a profound disregard for the safety and privacy of travelers, shattering the trust necessary for any international cooperation or travel in the region.

Immediate action is required. Daud issued a direct warning: “To governments whose citizens’ data is exposed: demand Somalia shut this system down immediately, not after review, now. To hosting and payment providers: you’re facilitating passport exposure in a terrorism hotspot while profiting from it. No contract or profit justifies enabling what comes next.” Travelers are advised to avoid this E-Visa system entirely and find alternative visa arrangements. International organizations must issue urgent security advisories, and airlines should suspend any requirement for the E-Visa. This is a failure of digital governance with lethal consequences, and its simplicity makes it all the more damning. The world must protect its citizens from Somalia’s digital chaos.

Transforming Hargeisa: A Strategic Review of Urban Infrastructure Development After 34 Years of Independence

Staff

October 17, 2025

Introduction

Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, is the political, economic, and cultural center of the nation. It covers an area of 180 km², divided into nine districts, and lies at an elevation of 1,334 meters above sea level. Today, the city’s population is estimated at around 1.8 million people, making it one of the fastest-growing urban centers in the Horn of Africa. Rapid urbanization has brought growth opportunities but has also placed significant pressure on infrastructure, public services, and governance.

The city’s infrastructure remains critically underdeveloped relative to its size and importance. According to Eng. Mouktar Ali (2025), Hargeisa has a road network of 118 roads totaling 253 kilometers, combining paved and unpaved surfaces. However, many of these roads are poorly designed, lack drainage systems, and fail to meet international standards. Beyond transport, the city faces deep deficits in healthcare and public services, with a shortage of at least 30 maternal and healthcare facilities and around 15 police stations. These gaps weaken both social services and community resilience.

Youth, who represent the majority of Hargeisa’s population, face particular challenges due to limited infrastructure. With a shortage of public playgrounds and recreational spaces, many children and young people are forced to play football on roads or on rented private playgrounds, often at risk of accidents. Education infrastructure is similarly strained: in several parts of the city, one cannot find a sequence of 8 kilometers containing any government-run primary or secondary schools. This reflects the absence of a systematic approach to educational infrastructure development in line with the city’s rapid population growth.

Urban planning challenges compound these problems. Poor electrical infrastructure, with widespread overhead power cables, has contributed to frequent market and residential fires, causing loss of life and destruction of property. In addition, inadequate zoning, unregulated settlements, and weak enforcement of construction standards have produced urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and unsafe living conditions. These realities underscore the urgent need for Hargeisa to adopt a coordinated infrastructure development strategy that addresses not only roads, but also healthcare, education, electricity, safety, and recreation.

Over the past 34 years of independence, Hargeisa has been led by 12 mayors, each contributing to the city’s infrastructure in varying degrees. While recent years have seen improvements in road expansion, the overall condition of infrastructure across sectors including roads, healthcare, education, and recreation remains below the standards expected of a modern capital city. This report explores the progress made, the leadership transitions, the current infrastructure situation, and the reforms necessary to transform Hargeisa into a resilient and sustainable city.

2 –Historical Overview of Leadership and Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s mayoral history illustrates both the challenges and opportunities of municipal governance. Between 1991 and 2003, the city had eight mayors, most serving for only one to two years. These were: Barre Nuux Xaaji C/laahi (1991–1992), Cumar Boobe (1992–1993), Maxamed Xaashi Cilmi (1994–1996), Muuse Maxamed Yuusuf (1996–1997), Cali Xasan Maxamuud ‘Cali Asad’ (1997–1999), C/raxmaan Ismaaciil Cadami (1999–2000), Cawl Cilmi Cabdalle (2000–2002), and Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Axmed Dheere’ (2002–2003). The brevity of their mandates meant that long-term infrastructure planning was virtually impossible, and projects were often fragmented or abandoned.

From 2003 to 2012, Xuseen Maxamuud Jiciir served nearly a decade, providing relative stability. His leadership marked the first attempt at structured road expansion, although financing and technical standards remained weak. His administration built several key roads but struggled to keep up with the city’s rapid urban growth.

In January 2013, Yuusuf Warsame Siciid was elected mayor but unfortunately passed away after only four months in office. He was succeeded by C/raxmaan Caydiid Soltelco, who served from 2013 until July 2021. Soltelco’s period marked the most consistent road expansion in Hargeisa’s history, though issues of design quality, sustainability, and limited resources persisted.

The current mayor, Cabdikariin Axmed Mooge, elected in May 2021, has overseen significant achievements in road development, introducing 104 kilometers of new or rehabilitated roads within four and a half years. This equates to approximately 26 kilometers per year, or three kilometers per district annually. While this represents an unprecedented improvement in municipal delivery capacity, it remains insufficient compared to international standards for capital cities of similar size and importance.

3 – Current State of Infrastructure

Today, Hargeisa’s road network reflects both progress and systemic limitations. Out of the 253 kilometers of roadways, only a fraction meet basic engineering standards. Many paved roads lack proper base and sub-base layers, leading to early deterioration under traffic loads. Unpaved roads dominate large sections of the network, exposing residents to dust during dry seasons and mud during rains, while drainage deficiencies frequently cause flooding and road damage.

The City Council’s achievement of implementing 104 kilometers of roads in four and a half years is commendable. However, these projects have often been undertaken with limited feasibility studies, geotechnical investigations, or compliance with internationally recognized design standards. The result is that many roads, although newly constructed, do not achieve long service life. Internationally, well-engineered roads are expected to last 15–20 years, while in Hargeisa, premature road failures are common within 2–3 years.

At the district level, the pace of infrastructure expansion is particularly low. With three kilometers added per district per year, large parts of the city remain underserved. Road connectivity between districts is inconsistent, and major commercial hubs face persistent congestion. The lack of pedestrian walkways, traffic management systems, and road safety measures further undermines the usability and inclusiveness of Hargeisa’s infrastructure.

The city’s geographical location and elevation also create challenges. At 1,334 meters above sea level, Hargeisa experiences unique hydrological conditions requiring effective storm water management systems. Unfortunately, drainage infrastructure has not kept pace with road construction, leaving many roads vulnerable to erosion and flood damage during the rainy season.

4 – Lack of Proper Planning and Prioritization in the Last 13 Years

Over the last 13 years, Hargeisa has made visible progress in expanding its road network and urban services, but the city has consistently struggled with poor planning and weak prioritization of infrastructure projects. Many developments have been carried out reactively, responding to immediate pressures rather than being guided by a comprehensive long-term urban development plan. As a result, projects are often fragmented, poorly located, and unable to serve the broader needs of the city.

One major issue has been the absence of a city-wide masterplan that aligns infrastructure investment with population growth, land use, and economic activities. Roads have been constructed without proper integration into a transport system that connects residential areas with markets, industrial zones, and social services. Some projects have even been implemented in locations that do not correspond to the city’s most urgent needs, leaving heavily populated districts underserved while less critical areas receive investments.

The lack of prioritization criteria has further weakened efficiency. Instead of systematically addressing healthcare facilities, schools, drainage, and electricity alongside roads, Hargeisa has often allocated limited funds to projects with high political visibility but little long-term impact. For example, while road paving has increased in certain districts, many neighborhoods still lack maternal health centers, adequate policing facilities, and fire protection infrastructure. This imbalance has left communities vulnerable despite heavy investment in certain sectors.

Finally, weak institutional capacity and political pressures have limited the effectiveness of urban planning. Without technical bodies to evaluate project locations, environmental impacts, and social needs, decision-making has frequently been influenced by short-term goals or donor-driven agendas. This has prevented Hargeisa from fully leveraging its resources to achieve balanced, equitable, and resilient infrastructure growth. If not corrected, these challenges will continue to undermine the city’s ability to serve its population of 1.8 million and prepare for the next decades of expansion.

5– Hargeisa’s Drainage and Flood Management Challenges

Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, faces persistent infrastructure problems during the rainy season, primarily due to inadequate drainage systems and weak flood control mechanisms. Despite the city’s favorable slope of 54 meters, ranging from an elevation of 1,334 meters at the highest point to 1,280 meters at the lowest, storm water does not drain efficiently across the urban landscape. This is largely because of human-induced and planning-related challenges that obstruct natural water flows. The following are the primary challenges hindering the city’s progress toward achieving resilient flood control and sustainable drainage management.

. Absence of a Comprehensive Stormwater Drainage Master Plan

A major obstacle to effective flood management in Hargeisa is the lack of an integrated master plan for stormwater drainage. Without a city-wide framework mapping natural water flows, flood-prone areas, and suitable infrastructure (such as culverts, retention basins, and storm channels), rainfall is left to follow uncontrolled paths. This causes flooding in urban roads, schools, markets, and community spaces. Current drainage efforts are fragmented and reactive; each neighborhood improvises temporary fixes that fail to solve the systemic issue. The absence of long-term planning leads to recurring damage, high maintenance costs, and disruption of economic and social activities.

2. Rapid Urbanization without Supporting Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s fast urban growth has far exceeded its infrastructure development. As new buildings and roads emerge, many are constructed on or across natural water paths, creating physical barriers that prevent normal drainage. This unregulated expansion traps rainwater in low-lying areas, resulting in recurrent flash floods. The situation is worsened by the lack of zoning laws and enforcement, causing new developments to repeat old mistakes. The cost of infrastructure repair, property loss, and business interruption continues to grow, underlining the urgent need for urban growth management and flood-sensitive planning.

3. Poor Solid Waste Management

Inadequate solid waste collection and disposal systems are aggravating Hargeisa’s flooding problem. Many residents dispose of garbage in open drains and riverbeds, which clogs natural water channels. When it rains, the blocked drains cause stagnant water, road erosion, and overflows that destroy property. Beyond the structural damage, this also creates major public health risks stagnant water fosters mosquito breeding and waterborne diseases such as cholera and malaria. Effective waste management must therefore be central to any drainage improvement plan, ensuring clean waterways and functional stormwater systems.

4. Limited Technical and Institutional Capacity

The city’s ability to design and manage sustainable drainage infrastructure is severely constrained by limited technical expertise and institutional coordination. There are few trained engineers, hydrologists, or urban planners capable of designing resilient flood management systems. As a result, most interventions are temporary, such as shallow trenches or makeshift barriers, which fail under heavy rain. Moreover, weak coordination among government agencies and poor data collection on rainfall and hydrology hinder evidence-based planning. Strengthening technical and institutional capacity is vital to ensure long-term, science-driven flood management.

5. Inadequate Funding and Dependence on Donors

Hargeisa’s stormwater management is severely underfunded. Most infrastructure budgets prioritize roads, schools, and electricity, leaving drainage as an afterthought. This financial neglect results in small, disjointed projects that fail to cover the entire city. Moreover, the heavy reliance on donor funding creates short-term and fragmented interventions often focused on isolated neighborhoods with little long-term maintenance. When donor support ends, many drainage systems deteriorate due to a lack of resources. Establishing a dedicated municipal budget and sustainable financing mechanisms is essential for lasting flood resilience.

6. Climate Change and Increasing Rainfall Variability

Climate change is amplifying Hargeisa’s flood risks. The city now experiences erratic rainfall long dry periods followed by sudden, intense storms. These extreme events easily overwhelm existing drainage systems, causing destructive flash floods that wash away roads, vehicles, and homes. The unpredictability of rainfall complicates planning and stretches already limited budgets. To adapt, Hargeisa must invest in climate-resilient infrastructure, improve forecasting, and integrate adaptive urban design principles that account for shifting weather patterns.

7. Encroachment on Natural Drainage Paths

Encroachment on natural waterways is among the most direct causes of flooding. Many residents and developers have built homes, shops, and other structures on dry riverbeds (togs) and valleys, blocking stormwater flow. This results in severe flooding of surrounding neighborhoods during rainstorms. Weak land-use regulations and poor enforcement by municipal authorities allow these risky developments to continue unchecked. Over time, such encroachments erode the city’s natural drainage capacity, transforming moderate rainfall into devastating flood events. Strict enforcement of urban zoning and relocation from flood-prone areas are crucial to restoring Hargeisa’s natural flood resilience.

6–Key Challenges Facing Hargeisa Infrastructure

The first and most pressing challenge is governance and continuity. With 12 mayors over 34 years, the city has lacked a permanent institutional framework dedicated solely to infrastructure planning and delivery. Political changes often disrupt project continuity, weaken institutional memory, and shift priorities away from long-term development.

Second, financing constraints severely limit road expansion and quality improvement. The Hargeisa City Council relies primarily on limited local taxes and irregular donor contributions. Without sustainable financing models, infrastructure projects often face cost-cutting measures that compromise durability and performance.

Third, technical standards and capacity remain insufficient. Road projects are frequently executed without detailed engineering designs, soil tests, or adherence to international best practices. Contractors and municipal engineers often work without updated guidelines, leading to weak pavements, poor drainage, and short road lifespans. The absence of independent quality control mechanisms exacerbates this challenge.

Fourth, urbanization pressures intensify the infrastructure gap. With rapid population growth and unplanned settlements, demand for roads, drainage, and public services far exceeds supply. Congestion, dust pollution, and flooding have become daily realities for many residents. Climate change further compounds these issues, exposing Hargeisa’s vulnerable infrastructure to greater risks of damage from extreme weather events.

6– Conclusion

After 34 years of independence, Hargeisa stands at a critical crossroads. The city’s impressive growth and emerging infrastructure improvements demonstrate resilience, ambition, and civic commitment but these gains remain fragile without coordinated, long-term planning. The recurring challenges of poor drainage, weak technical standards, unregulated urbanization, and underfunded public services reveal a city striving to modernize without the institutional tools required for sustainability. To secure its future, Hargeisa must shift from reactive governance to strategic investment, from short-term projects to enduring citywide systems, and from political fragmentation to professional, accountable management.

If the recommended actions are implemented establishing a planning authority, adopting a master plan, enforcing zoning, improving financing, strengthening technical capacity, and embedding climate resilience Hargeisa can transform into a modern, well-planned, and livable capital that reflects the aspirations of its people and the legacy of Somaliland’s hard-won independence. The next decade must be a decade of urban transformation, where leadership, planning, and innovation converge to build a city worthy of its history and future potential.

Finally, Hargeisa requires a comprehensive urban masterplan for the next 20–30 years, integrating roads, public transport, pedestrian walkways, and storm water systems. Strategic planning must align infrastructure with projected population growth, economic expansion, and climate resilience. With such reforms, Hargeisa can transition from patchwork development to a modern, well-planned city that reflects its status as the heart of Somaliland.

7– Recommendations

1. Establish a Permanent Municipal Infrastructure Planning and Coordination Authority

Hargeisa urgently needs a permanent and professional municipal body dedicated to infrastructure planning, coordination, and implementation. Frequent leadership changes, with 12 mayors over 34 years, have created gaps in continuity and accountability. A specialized Hargeisa Infrastructure and Planning Authority (HIPA) should be established with legal autonomy, technical experts, and clear mandates for urban planning, road design, flood management, and service delivery. This institution should ensure that each new mayor continues existing projects under a shared city development framework, minimizing waste and political disruption. A stable institutional framework will promote consistent standards, better coordination among sectors, and stronger partnerships with national and international development agencies.

2. Develop a Comprehensive Urban Master Plan with Integrated Infrastructure Components

The lack of a comprehensive urban master plan has resulted in fragmented, reactive development. Hargeisa must develop a modern, GIS-based City Master Plan that integrates land use, transportation, housing, drainage, water, energy, and green spaces. This plan should align population growth projections with infrastructure priorities, ensuring that schools, hospitals, markets, and roads are equitably distributed across all districts. Such a plan must be developed collaboratively, engaging urban planners, engineers, economists, and community leaders to reflect both technical and social realities. The master plan should be legally binding to guide all public and private development, prevent unregulated construction, and promote sustainable urban expansion.

3. Improve Infrastructure Financing and Establish a Dedicated Municipal Fund

Inadequate and inconsistent funding remains one of Hargeisa’s largest obstacles. To overcome this, the city should introduce a Municipal Infrastructure Development Fund supported by diverse revenue sources, including local taxes, land rates, utility levies, and partnerships with private investors. Transparent financial management and annual public reporting would enhance trust and attract donor confidence. Furthermore, the city should explore public-private partnerships (PPPs) for key projects such as roads, drainage, and waste management, ensuring quality standards and long-term maintenance. Sustainable financing mechanisms will allow the municipality to shift from short-term donor dependency to a self-reliant, planned investment model.

4. Enforce Urban Zoning, Building Regulations, and Drainage Protection Measures

Encroachment on waterways and unregulated construction have made Hargeisa highly vulnerable to floods and fire hazards. Strict enforcement of zoning laws and building codes is critical to restoring the city’s environmental balance. The municipality should demarcate and protect natural drainage paths, valleys, and green corridors to serve as natural flood buffers. Illegal structures on riverbeds should be systematically removed, with fair compensation or relocation plans where necessary. Strengthening urban inspection teams and digitalizing land permits will minimize corruption and ensure that development adheres to urban safety and sustainability standards. Such enforcement not only protects public safety but also preserves the city’s natural hydrology.

5. Strengthen Technical Capacity, Research, and Quality Control in Infrastructure Development

Hargeisa’s infrastructure quality problems stem largely from limited technical expertise and the absence of quality assurance systems. To reverse this trend, the city should establish a Municipal Engineering and Quality Control Department responsible for all technical evaluations, design reviews, and on-site inspections. Engineers and planners should receive regular professional training in modern urban design, geotechnical investigation, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Partnerships with local universities such as the University of Hargeisa can support research into cost-effective and locally adapted engineering solutions. Establishing design standards and independent testing laboratories will ensure that every project meets international safety and durability benchmarks.

6. Prioritize Drainage and Flood Management as Core Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s drainage and flood challenges demand a strategic, citywide response. The municipality should urgently develop a Stormwater Drainage Master Plan supported by detailed hydrological studies, topographic mapping, and climate modeling. Key interventions should include the construction of retention basins, underground drainage tunnels, lined channels, and routine maintenance systems. Drainage infrastructure should be integrated into every new road or housing project. Furthermore, community education campaigns should discourage dumping of solid waste in watercourses. Integrating drainage planning into all urban development decisions will prevent recurring damage, improve public health, and reduce post-rainy-season rehabilitation costs.

7. Expand Social Infrastructure: Healthcare, Education, and Recreation

Physical infrastructure alone cannot sustain a growing city without parallel investments in human and social development. Hargeisa must prioritize the construction of maternal health centers, schools, and recreational facilities in underserved districts. The absence of public playgrounds, community libraries, and youth centers has social consequences, fostering idleness and limiting children’s development. Government and local NGOs should collaborate to establish multi-purpose community centers that combine education, health, and recreation services. Ensuring equitable access to these facilities will strengthen social cohesion and improve the overall quality of life in the city.

8. Adopt Climate-Resilient Urban Design and Sustainable Practices

Given the increasing variability of rainfall and rising temperatures, Hargeisa must embrace climate-resilient infrastructure planning. This involves using permeable paving materials, green roofs, rainwater harvesting systems, and urban green belts that absorb runoff and improve air quality. Building codes should mandate the inclusion of climate adaptation features in all public and private projects. Integrating solar-powered streetlights, energy-efficient buildings, and sustainable waste management will not only reduce costs but also position Hargeisa as a model for environmentally conscious urban development in the Horn of Africa.

This report represents my contribution to the future of Hargeisa and its people, offering a roadmap for building resilient and sustainable infrastructure. As our city continues to grow, addressing the challenges of drainage, flood control, and urban planning is not just a technical necessity but a foundation for economic growth, public health, and social stability. I hope that this document will serve as a valuable reference for policymakers, urban planners, and future mayors who carry the responsibility of shaping Hargeisa into a safer and more livable city.

Drawing from more than a decade of professional experience, I have witnessed firsthand the successes and failures of infrastructure projects across Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. These experiences have reinforced my belief that informed planning, strong institutions, and strategic investments are the keys to sustainable development. Through this report, I aim to share both knowledge and vision that can guide the city toward solutions rooted in local realities yet aligned with international best practices.

About the Author

Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali
Infrastructure Analyst – Somaliland
Specialist in Regional Development and Infrastructure in the Horn of Africa

Ethiopia Must Now Compete: President Cirro Departs for Addis After UAE Marathon as Congress Authorizes Hargeisa Office

Staff

October 14, 2025

HARGEISA – President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” of the Republic of Somaliland has departed for Addis Ababa on an official visit to Ethiopia, marking his first trip to the neighboring country since assuming office in January 2025. The high-stakes diplomatic mission arrives at a critical juncture for Horn of Africa geopolitics, nine months after Ethiopia signed the Ankara Declaration with Somalia—a move that left the future of the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding hanging in the balance.

The timing of the visit is particularly intriguing. President Cirro departed for Ethiopia just one day after returning from his third trip to the United Arab Emirates this year—a visit that lasted more than two weeks. Sources familiar with the President’s UAE engagements, speaking on strict condition of anonymity, confirmed that Cirro held meetings with high-level Emirati officials during his extended stay. Whether the immediate pivot to Addis Ababa is connected to these UAE discussions remains unclear, but the sequencing has not escaped the attention of regional analysts.

The President’s delegation, which departed from Hargeisa today aboard a chartered aircraft, includes the Ministers of Finance, Public Works, and Investment. Notably, several key officials had already traveled to Addis Ababa in advance of the President’s arrival, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of the National Armed Forces, and the Director of National Intelligence. This advance team’s presence underscores the meticulous preparation surrounding what promises to be consequential talks.

The UAE Factor: A Diplomatic Puzzle

The elephant in the room is the UAE connection. President Cirro’s three trips to Abu Dhabi since taking office—with the most recent lasting over two weeks—represent an unusually intense diplomatic engagement with the Gulf state. The UAE has positioned itself as a critical player in Horn of Africa dynamics, with massive investments in both Somaliland’s Berbera Port (managed by DP World) and the Berbera Corridor connecting the port to Ethiopia’s industrial heartland.

The Emirati government also maintains close ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, having supported his administration through various domestic and regional challenges. As one analyst noted in a previous Somaliland Chronicle piece, “The rise of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister of Ethiopia solidified Addis Ababa’s relations with Abu Dhabi. UAE supported Abiy’s major domestic and foreign policy objectives.”

Could the UAE be facilitating a diplomatic reset between Somaliland and Ethiopia? The timing—departing for Addis just 24 hours after returning from a lengthy Abu Dhabi stay—suggests coordination at the highest levels. The UAE has both the economic interests and the political capital to broker a revival of the Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership, particularly given its substantial investments in infrastructure projects that would benefit enormously from stable bilateral relations.

Sources who spoke to Somaliland Chronicle refused to confirm any direct connection between the UAE meetings and the Addis visit, but the circumstantial evidence is compelling. The UAE has consistently demonstrated a preference for pragmatic, business-oriented diplomacy over ideological posturing—exactly the kind of approach that could unlock the strategic gridlock that has paralyzed the Ethiopia-Somaliland relationship since the Ankara Declaration.

The High-Wire Act of Horn Diplomacy

The prolonged delay in President Cirro’s first visit to Ethiopia breaks with historical precedent and has raised eyebrows in both Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. Traditionally, Somaliland presidents have made Ethiopia one of their first foreign destinations after taking office, reflecting the critical nature of the bilateral relationship. That President Cirro waited nearly ten months before making the journey—choosing instead to visit the UAE three times—has fueled speculation about the state of Ethiopia-Somaliland relations.

Whether the delay originated from Somaliland’s side or Ethiopia’s remains unclear, but the resulting perception gap has proven damaging. In a candid January interview with The Reporter Ethiopia, Dr. Dareskedar Taye of Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs remarked that “the new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.” Such perceptions from Ethiopian officials, warranted or not, underscore how the absence of high-level engagement can breed misunderstanding and mistrust.

Such perceptions have real consequences. Ethiopia’s pivot toward Somalia through Turkish-mediated talks—culminating in the December 2024 Ankara Declaration—effectively shelved the original MoU that promised Ethiopian recognition in exchange for naval access to Berbera. For many Somalilanders, watching Ethiopia pursue alternative arrangements through Mogadishu felt like a betrayal of the strategic partnership that had been decades in the making.

Yet the fundamental realities that made the January 2024 MoU inevitable remain unchanged. Ethiopia’s landlocked status, its crippling dependency on Djibouti (which handles 95 percent of its trade at a cost of over $1.5 billion annually), and the geographic proximity of its industrial heartland to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast create an inescapable strategic logic. The Turkish-led mediation’s failure to produce a viable alternative through Somalia has, if anything, vindicated the original Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership.

What’s on the Table?

According to the presidential statement, discussions will focus on “strengthening historical ties, strategic cooperation, and mutual interests, particularly in security, economy, trade, and movement between the two countries.” But the real question is whether this visit will breathe new life into the original MoU or forge an entirely new framework for cooperation.

In an exclusive interview with Somaliland Chronicle last month, former President Muse Bihi Abdi of the Republic of Somaliland offered a candid assessment of why the original MoU failed to materialize. Bihi indicated that Ethiopia succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland. His remarks provide crucial context for understanding what’s at stake in President Cirro’s current mission: is this trip a genuine opportunity for Ethiopia to attempt a reset—pursuing Red Sea access and recognition through an “MoU 2.0” framework—or merely a diplomatic courtesy call between new partners?

The answer could define the trajectory of Horn of Africa geopolitics for the next generation.

Reconsidering the Partnership: Has Ethiopia Proven Itself Worthy?

The original MoU’s failure raises uncomfortable questions that President Cirro’s administration must confront head-on: Is Ethiopia a reliable partner, or merely a fair-weather friend that retreats at the first sign of external pressure?

The evidence suggests the latter. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s January 2024 agreement with President Bihi was heralded as a historic breakthrough—Ethiopia’s quest for sea access finally aligned with Somaliland’s three-decade pursuit of recognition. Yet within months, as regional pushback intensified, Abiy pivoted. Rather than standing by his commitments to Somaliland, he pursued the Ankara Declaration with Somalia, effectively abandoning his Hargeisa partners in favor of appeasing Mogadishu, Ankara, and Cairo.

Former President Bihi’s assessment in his exclusive Somaliland Chronicle interview was damning but diplomatic: Ethiopia “succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland.” A more blunt reading would be that when tested, Abiy folded. The question facing Cirro is whether any “MoU 2.0” would fare differently, or if Somaliland would again find itself jilted once Egypt applies pressure through the GERD negotiations, or Turkey threatens to cut development finance, or Somalia mobilizes another regional coalition.

The strategic landscape has fundamentally shifted since January 2024, and not in Ethiopia’s favor. Then, Addis Ababa was Somaliland’s most promising suitor—the only regional power with both the motivation and the means to offer recognition. Today, Somaliland faces an embarrassment of riches. The United States Congress is actively legislating direct bilateral ties through a representative office in Hargeisa. Senator Cruz, who chairs the Africa subcommittee, is personally lobbying President Trump for full recognition. American strategic interest in countering China, accessing Berbera’s port and 4-kilometer airstrip, and establishing a foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has never been higher.

This shifts the negotiating calculus entirely. Somaliland no longer needs to offer Ethiopia a sweetheart deal in exchange for recognition that may or may not materialize depending on Abiy’s domestic political calculations or his willingness to weather regional pressure. Instead, Hargeisa can negotiate from a position of strength: If Ethiopia wants preferential access to Berbera over Djibouti, what is Addis Ababa prepared to offer beyond vague promises that crumbled once before?

Any MoU 2.0 discussion must include ironclad guarantees that were absent from the original agreement. Ethiopia must commit to immediate, not gradual, recognition—with a clear timeline and public announcements that preclude backtracking. The terms must be structured to survive external pressure: legally binding treaties ratified by both parliaments, not memoranda that can be quietly shelved when convenient. And crucially, Somaliland must secure concurrent commitments from other partners—the UAE, potentially the United States—that create a web of relationships too costly for any single party to abandon.

President Cirro’s challenge is not simply to resurrect the MoU, but to determine whether Ethiopia has learned from its failure and is prepared to act like a serious partner—or whether Somaliland’s future lies not in Addis Ababa’s uncertain promises, but in Washington’s legislative momentum and Abu Dhabi’s patient capital. The fact that Cirro spent two weeks in the UAE before flying to Ethiopia for what may be only a 2-3 day visit speaks volumes about where Somaliland’s strategic priorities—and expectations—now lie.

Ethiopia had its chance to be the historic first. Now it must compete for the privilege.

The original January 2024 agreement—signed by President Muse Bihi Abdi and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—granted Ethiopia a 50-year lease on 20 kilometers of Somaliland coastline for commercial and military purposes, with the understanding that Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. The deal also included provisions for Somaliland to acquire stakes in Ethiopian Airlines and deepened security cooperation, including a comprehensive training program for approximately 8,000 Somaliland commandos.

President Cirro, who opposed aspects of the deal during his time as opposition leader, has been characteristically measured in his public statements about the MoU. His April address to Parliament conspicuously omitted any reference to the agreement, leading some observers to question his commitment to the partnership. This visit to Addis Ababa will either dispel those doubts or confirm Ethiopia’s worst fears.

The American Factor: Washington’s Growing Embrace

While Ethiopia hedged and Somalia raged, a seismic shift has been unfolding in Washington that could fundamentally alter the calculus for all parties involved. The United States—long content to maintain studied ambiguity on Somaliland’s status—appears to be abandoning its traditional posture in favor of direct engagement that stops just short of formal recognition.

In August 2025, Senator Ted Cruz, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, sent a formal letter to President Trump urging immediate recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The letter was notable not just for its unequivocal stance, but for the strategic framework Cruz outlined: “Somaliland has emerged as a critical security and diplomatic partner for the United States, helping America advance our national security interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.”

Cruz’s letter emphasized Somaliland’s strategic location “along the Gulf of Aden, putting it near one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors,” and highlighted a crucial geopolitical dimension that directly threatens Somaliland’s partnership with both Ethiopia and the UAE: “The Chinese Communist Party is using economic and diplomatic coercion to punish Somaliland for its support for Taiwan, as well as to undermine that support.”

But the most significant development came one month later. In September 2025, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced H.R. 5300, the Department of State Policy Provisions Act, which includes Section 305: “Ensuring smooth travel and investment in Somaliland.” The language is bureaucratic, but its implications are revolutionary.

The bill explicitly directs the Secretary of State to consider “establishing a representative office in Hargeisa, Somaliland” and creating separate “bifurcation of travel advisory warnings between Somalia and Somaliland.” This isn’t mere symbolism—it represents the legislative groundwork for direct bilateral diplomatic relations between the United States and Somaliland, independent of Mogadishu.

A U.S. representative office in Hargeisa would constitute de facto recognition, creating a direct diplomatic channel that bypasses Somalia entirely. It would make the United States the first major power to establish such a presence, fundamentally legitimizing Somaliland’s claim to statehood in ways that decades of functional independence could not achieve alone. For context, this is the exact pathway the United States used to maintain relations with Taiwan—a representative office that functions as an embassy in all but name.

The timing of this American interest creates both opportunity and urgency for President Cirro’s Ethiopia visit. If Washington beats Addis Ababa to the punch by establishing that representative office and offering Somaliland security guarantees—perhaps including access to Berbera for U.S. naval operations—Ethiopia’s unique leverage evaporates overnight. The port-for-recognition equation only works if Ethiopia is the first mover. If America moves first, Somaliland gains recognition without needing to offer Ethiopia anything beyond continued trade access.

This emerging American interest may explain the UAE connection. Abu Dhabi, which maintains close ties with both Washington and Addis Ababa, has every incentive to coordinate between the three parties to ensure their massive infrastructure investments in Berbera and the corridor to Ethiopia don’t become casualties of competing recognition bids. Could President Cirro’s extended UAE consultations have been aimed at orchestrating a synchronized approach—one where American diplomatic support, Ethiopian recognition, and Emirati economic backing all converge to create an irresistible momentum toward Somaliland’s emergence as the world’s newest nation?

The Regional Chess Game

The stakes extend far beyond bilateral relations. The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership triggered a diplomatic tantrum from Somalia, which mobilized support from Egypt, Turkey, and increasingly, China in a single-minded campaign to prevent Somaliland’s recognition at any cost. Somalia’s approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active proxy warfare, including fueling the Las Anod crisis in a calculated attempt to destabilize Somaliland from within. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s inflammatory rhetoric—reportedly declaring “jihad” from mosque pulpits and threatening alignment with Al-Shabaab—underscores how Mogadishu has prioritized blocking Somaliland over governing its own territory.

Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Turkey’s February 2024 defense pact with Somalia established a naval presence explicitly designed to counter Ethiopian maritime ambitions. For these actors, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than addressing terrorism, state failure, or economic development.

Meanwhile, Djibouti—which stands to lose billions in port revenue from any Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership—has taken increasingly hostile actions, including closing Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills. The move was widely interpreted as retaliation for the MoU.

A Closing Window of Opportunity

The legal architecture of any Ethiopian naval base requires a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—a binding international treaty that can only be negotiated between sovereign entities. This creates a de facto recognition pathway that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels, similar to precedents ranging from the US lease of Guantanamo Bay to the progressive recognition of Kosovo.

However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage may be time-limited. Long-standing US strategic interest in Berbera’s airport and port facilities could translate into direct American military presence under a future administration, providing Somaliland an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage. For Addis Ababa, the question is whether to seize this moment or risk watching another power claim the prize.

For President Cirro, the visit represents an opportunity to demonstrate that Somaliland’s new leadership remains committed to the independence project—not through inflammatory rhetoric, but through calculated strategic partnerships. His administration faces a fundamental choice: continue the previous government’s bold gambit for recognition through the Ethiopian partnership, or pursue a more cautious approach that risks squandering three decades of de facto statehood.

The Verdict Awaits

As President Cirro’s aircraft touches down in Addis Ababa, the Horn of Africa holds its breath. This visit could mark the resurrection of the MoU and a decisive step toward Somaliland’s long-sought recognition. Or it could represent another chapter in the endless cycle of diplomatic positioning that has characterized the region for generations.

What is clear is that the geographic and strategic realities haven’t changed. Ethiopia needs reliable sea access. Somaliland needs international recognition. And the alternative—continued dependency on Djibouti, continued isolation for Somaliland, continued instability in Somalia—serves no one’s interests except those actively working to maintain the dysfunctional status quo.

The next 48 hours will reveal whether two leaders with the courage to reshape the Horn’s diplomatic architecture can overcome domestic skeptics, regional spoilers, and international pressure to forge a partnership that reflects geographic reality rather than diplomatic fiction.

Stay tuned to Somaliland Chronicle for comprehensive coverage of President Cirro’s historic visit to Ethiopia.

Presidential Press Release issued by Hussein Adan Cigaal (Deyr), Spokesperson for the President of the Republic of Somaliland

From Antagonism to Accord: The Nairobi Agreement and the New Reality Between Republic of Somaliland and Puntland Federal Member State

Staff

October 6, 2025

Key Points

Historic Agreement: On October 4-5, 2025, in Nairobi, the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State of Somalia signed a landmark security and cooperation accord aimed at ending decades of conflict.
Core Provisions: The deal establishes joint cooperation in counter-terrorism, maritime security, trade, and a cooperative approach to peace in Erigavo.
Major Political Development: In a significant political statement within the communiqué, Puntland formally welcomed the Republic of Somaliland’s “progress in Governance and its right to its self-determination”.
Domestic Opposition: The accord faces opposition within Somaliland, with critics citing constitutional concerns over sovereignty, while the government defends it as a pragmatic solution to inherited problems.
Strategic Challenge: A central test for Hargeisa will be managing the asymmetric risks of the agreement, particularly how to leverage cooperation in regions like Sool without inadvertently ceding further influence to Puntland.

The joint security and cooperation accord concluded in Nairobi on October 4-5, 2025, constitutes a watershed moment in the relationship between the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State. The Somaliland delegation, led by the Minister of Presidency, Mr. Khadar Abdi Loge, met with Puntland officials to finalize the historic agreement. After decades defined by territorial disputes, military confrontations, and mutual recrimination, these two historically antagonistic polities have committed to a framework of security cooperation, economic facilitation, and reconciliation support. This rapprochement is rendered all the more significant by its timing, coinciding with Puntland’s profound estrangement from the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu.

SL_PL_joint_commnique Download

While the accord marks a significant diplomatic achievement in de-escalating regional tensions, its implementation presents a formidable test for President Cirro’s administration. The agreement’s success hinges on Hargeisa’s ability to navigate fierce domestic opposition, manage the strategic risks of an asymmetric relationship with Puntland, and translate diplomatic text into tangible security and economic progress on the ground.

Puntland’s Strategic Drift from Mogadishu

A nuanced understanding of the Nairobi accord’s significance necessitates an appreciation of the Puntland Federal Member State’s increasingly fraught relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia. In March 2024, Puntland initiated a fundamental rupture with the federal system, the culmination of protracted disputes over constitutional amendments, electoral processes, and what its leadership perceived as systemic federal encroachment. This has created a strategic environment wherein Puntland increasingly functions as a de facto autonomous entity, pursuing its own diplomatic and security relationships.

The Geopolitical Undercurrents: The US and UAE Connection

Both the Republic of Somaliland and Puntland have cultivated extensive security and economic partnerships with the United Arab Emirates. These parallel relationships have engendered similar institutional frameworks and furnished discreet backchannels for coordination. The United States also maintains security cooperation with both entities, and its strategic imperatives in the Horn of Africa are advanced by a de-escalation of tensions. The selection of Nairobi as the venue provided a neutral setting for the negotiations. The communiqué itself welcomes the international community’s support for peace and notes both parties’ readiness for “fruitful cooperation”.

Competing Principles: The Dialectic of Borders and Bloodlines

Any substantive assessment must contend with the fundamental ideological cleavage that has animated conflict in the eastern regions. The Republic of Somaliland’s territorial claims are anchored in the principle of uti possidetis juris (the inheritance of colonial borders). Puntland, conversely, has articulated claims predicated on clan genealogy. The Nairobi accord does not resolve this philosophical tension. However, it introduces a significant development with the clause stating that Puntland formally welcomes the Republic of Somaliland’s “right to its self-determination”.

The Reality of SSC-Khatumo’s Circumscribed Authority

In truth, SSC-Khatumo’s effective governance is confined primarily to Las Anod and its environs. While the Sanaag region is constitutionally part of Somaliland, it is characterized by a fragmented political landscape. Puntland maintains significant influence with certain communities there, an element that Hargeisa may view as a potentially useful factor in resolving local divisions and fostering broader stability. This complex reality underscores why Mogadishu’s recognition of SSC-Khatumo, while politically symbolic, has failed to materialize into the administrative capacity required to project governance across all its claimed territories.

It is within this fragmented and contested landscape that the Nairobi accord attempts to introduce a new paradigm of cooperation.

From a Paradigm of Confrontation to One of Cooperation

The Nairobi accord signifies a paradigmatic shift away from a zero-sum calculus. The commitment to joint operations against al-Shabab acknowledges a common threat. The agreement to facilitate cross-border trade addresses economic realities long obscured by political antagonism. Perhaps most significantly, the pledge to support reconciliation in Erigavo—a process initiated by Somaliland’s president and supported by Puntland—indicates an evolution toward a more nuanced conception of governance.

Implications for the Regional Order

The accord carries implications that reverberate well beyond the immediate bilateral relationship. For the Republic of Somaliland, it represents diplomatic progress at a moment of significant traction within the United States Congress. The agreement demonstrates Somaliland’s capacity for sophisticated statecraft—simultaneously managing complex regional relationships while advancing its broader strategic objectives. For Puntland, the accord is a manifestation of its increasingly independent foreign policy trajectory.

Domestic Political Controversy: Constitutional Questions and Status Anxiety

The Nairobi accord has generated considerable domestic controversy. A widely circulated statement attributed to former minister Dr. Abdiweli Soufi articulated specific constitutional and strategic concerns, identifying Puntland’s designated role in Erigavo peace efforts and provisions on airspace management as potential violations of the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty. The critique voices a broader anxiety that entering into an agreement with a Federal Member State of Somalia fundamentally obscures Somaliland’s claimed status as an independent republic.

In responses across social media and political forums, government supporters have argued that this criticism ignores the profound irony of the opposition raising alarms over territorial integrity. Their central counterargument is anchored in the Las Anod crisis that unfolded under the previous Kulmiye administration, which they contend was a far more grievous compromise of Somaliland’s territory than any diplomatic engagement. This counter-narrative posits that the Nairobi accord is a pragmatic attempt to manage the consequences of past failures.

The Sool Dilemma: Strategic Opportunity versus Asymmetric Risk

While the accord focuses on cooperation in Sanaag, its implicit consequences for the Sool region present both an opportunity and a risk for Somaliland. The new framework could create a pathway for Hargeisa to rebuild influence, but this is complicated by Puntland’s deep historical connection to the area. This creates a fundamental asymmetry: the Puntland Federal Member State wields socio-political leverage within communities inside Somaliland’s constitutional borders, whereas Somaliland possesses no reciprocal influence inside Puntland proper. The challenge for Hargeisa will be to leverage the accord’s cooperative spirit without inadvertently ceding further ground in territories Puntland already claims.

A Foundation for Peace

Despite formidable challenges, the Nairobi accord represents the most significant diplomatic progress between the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State in decades. It signals a mutual recognition of the strategic bankruptcy inherent in previous policies of confrontation. The ultimate metric of its success, however, will not be the diplomatic fanfare surrounding its inception, but rather its capacity to yield tangible improvements in the lives of the region’s inhabitants. The coming months will be the crucible of implementation, testing whether the political will that produced this agreement can sustain the arduous work of translating commitments into reality.

A Tale of Two Capitals: Hargeisa Rises as Mogadishu Falls

Staff

October 5, 2025

By Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal
Representative of the Republic of Somaliland to the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Yesterday’s assault on Godka Jilacow Prison in Mogadishu has once again exposed the depth of dysfunction within Somalia’s federal government. A facility long regarded as one of the most secure in the country was overrun by Al Shabaab militants in a coordinated attack involving suicide bombers and gunmen that freed prisoners and humiliated the authorities.

#ALERT: Explosions, Gunfire, and Casualties: Somali Spy Agency Compound Under Siege. Somali Intelligence Headquarters Hit by Devastating Attack.

Reports from Mogadishu confirm that a powerful car bomb has exploded at the main gate of Godka Jilicoow, the detention and… pic.twitter.com/ps7BRVOGMQ
— Baidoa Online (@BaidoaOnline) October 4, 2025

The timing of the assault was painfully symbolic. Only hours earlier, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration had declared that Mogadishu was “fully secured” and celebrated the reopening of roads that had been closed for years due to insecurity. By nightfall, the claim collapsed in flames. What unfolded was not merely a terrorist incident but the unmasking of a government trapped between illusion and failure.

On Saturday morning Somali PM Barre and spy chief Mahad Salad launched "Mogadishu is safe" campaign.

40 roads closed for security reasons were reopened.

PM and NISA DG toured some of roads being cleared of concrete barriers.

On Saturday evening, barely hours after fanfare,… pic.twitter.com/gBml1oD8RB
— Rashid Abdi (@RAbdiAnalyst) October 4, 2025

Somalia’s leadership has become a theatre of contradictions. While its citizens live under daily threat, the administration remains consumed by political ambition, corruption, and an unhealthy preoccupation with Somaliland. Instead of confronting the crisis consuming its own capital, President Hassan Sheikh and his Prime Minister, Hamza Barre, have diverted their limited resources to antagonising Somaliland through inflammatory rhetoric and covert interference.

The involvement of Somali intelligence operatives and senior officials in fuelling the conflict in the Sool region last year is well documented. Their actions prolonged violence and sought to undermine Somaliland’s peace and stability. The same destructive agenda is now being advanced in the Awdal region, with Somalia’s Minister of Defence, Ahmed Fiqi, recently declaring that Somalia’s flag would soon fly in Awdal, Burao, and other parts of Somaliland. His statements, utterly detached from reality, reveal a desperate attempt to manufacture tension and mischief for political gain.

While Mogadishu’s leadership interferes beyond its borders, the federal system it presides over continues to unravel. Relations with Puntland and Jubaland are effectively non-existent, exposing the fallacy of a federal structure that exists only in name. The fallout with its own federal member states is a direct consequence of Mogadishu’s reckless policy of attempting to subvert Somaliland, a policy that has instead fuelled fragmentation and accelerated the Balkanisation of Somalia’s internal political order. Western diplomats have described such reckless behaviour as an act of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The National Consultative Council has degenerated into a stage for political rivalry rather than coordination, and the federal member states now pursue independent agendas with little reference to the centre. Even within Mogadishu, infighting between ministries, factions, and security organs has paralysed governance and eroded public confidence.

Corruption has become the defining hallmark of the administration. Public lands are sold in secret deals. Development funds disappear into private accounts. The appointment of President Hassan Sheikh’s own daughter to a senior advisory position at Villa Somalia epitomises a culture where nepotism displaces merit and loyalty outweighs competence. Donor nations have grown increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the continuous injection of taxpayers’ money into what has become a bottomless pit, where stagnation replaces progress and a financial lifeline has become both a crutch and a curse. The system now sustains a political elite that prospers through dependency and deceit. US lawmakers have reported that USAID, once regarded as a cornerstone of American development assistance and a vital source of support for many deserving nations, has been abolished in response to corruption, mismanagement, and pilfering in countries such as Somalia.

The institutions entrusted with defending the state are themselves compromised. The National Intelligence and Security Agency, which controls Godka Jilacow Prison, has long been infiltrated by Al Shabaab and its sympathisers. Senior officers are implicated in illicit trade, corruption, and the deliberate leakage of sensitive information. When those charged with safeguarding a nation become complicit in its subversion, the concept of sovereignty loses all meaning.

The international community must now confront an undeniable truth. After decades of investment, training, and diplomatic backing, Somalia remains in a state of perpetual crisis. Its government survives not on legitimacy but on foreign subsidy. The international approach to Somalia has become the equivalent of “flogging a dead horse”, an exercise in futility that rewards dysfunction and punishes accountability.

For the people of Somaliland, these events offer no cause for celebration but stand as a powerful vindication of the choice made in 1991. When Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland exercised its right to withdraw from an illegitimate union, a decision that was not only consistent with the legal principle of Remedial Right to Self Determination but also served as a necessary remedy for decades of injustice and oppression. The passage of time and history of the past thirty-three years has fully exonerated that decision. Had Somaliland not chosen that path, it would almost certainly be facing the same turmoil and instability that grips Mogadishu today. By reaffirming its independence, Somaliland charted a course towards peace, democracy, and institution building.

While Somalia’s leaders issue empty threats about flags, Somaliland builds schools and roads. Through determination and sacrifice, it has created a state founded on accountable governance and national discipline. Today, it maintains its own security, conducts credible elections, and engages confidently with international partners from London and Washington to Taipei, achieving stability not through dependency or slogans but through vision, hard work, and integrity.

The contrast is striking. Every explosion in the south reinforces the wisdom of Somaliland’s decision to stand apart. Every scandal in Mogadishu strengthens the case for recognising Somaliland’s sovereignty. The international community should draw the only logical conclusion. Stability and progress are not found in fragile states sustained by aid but in capable governments that earn legitimacy through service. Somaliland has done precisely that. It is time for policymakers around the world to recognise and reward competence rather than failure. It is time to increase engagement with Somaliland as a credible and responsible partner.

Hassan Sheikh’s government may continue to issue proclamations and provocations, but it cannot conceal the truth. The Somali state it claims to lead is fragmented, infiltrated, and adrift. A leadership that cannot protect its prisons or its people has forfeited any moral authority to lecture others about unity or sovereignty.

History will remember that while Mogadishu’s rulers pursued the politics of illusion, Somaliland quietly built a functioning State. The lesson is clear: legitimacy is earned through performance, not proclaimed by decree. In the Horn of Africa, it is Somaliland that stands as the genuine example of resilience, governance, and national dignity.

About the Author

Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal currently serves as the Republic of Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan. A seasoned diplomat and politician with extensive experience in African and Asian geopolitics. Ambassador Galaal has held multiple senior government positions,

including Ambassador to Ethiopia, State Minister for Planning and National Development, and State Minister for Health. He has represented Somaliland in high-level negotiations across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and is widely recognised for his expertise in regional security and development strategy. His work draws on a strong background in law, governance, public policy, and international advocacy.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

From Controversy to Cornerstone: DP World’s Lesson for Egal Airport

Staff

September 22, 2025

Many got DP World’s Berbera deal wrong, but Berbera thrived. Maharat could reshape Somaliland’s skies too—but only if scrutiny, not hope, carries the day.

Each evening as dusk falls, Egal International Airport — Somaliland’s lone international gateway — is forced to shut down. This is not because of security threats or curfew protocols, but because the country’s most vital infrastructure asset still lacks the lighting and navigation systems required to operate safely after dark. For a nation that markets itself as the stable, business-friendly alternative in the Horn of Africa, this daily closure is more than a nuisance. It is a glaring symbol of institutional neglect and decades of serial mismanagement.

But this nightly shutdown is only the surface-level humiliation. Beneath it lies a more urgent and potentially catastrophic crisis: the very runway on which Somaliland’s economic lifeline depends is rapidly collapsing. Designed to last ten years, it has not even made it to its midpoint before exhibiting signs of critical failure. Aviation professionals warn the surface could become unusable within months, not years, effectively severing Somaliland from the world.

At the center of this crisis is the Minister of Aviation himself, Fuad Ahmed Nuh, an official who has cultivated a meticulous public image through slickly produced social media videos showcasing a lavishly furnished office and an air of modern competence. Though he has only held the post for nine months and inherited an airport in a state of advanced decay, he has unequivocally chosen this controversial $70 million deal as his signature initiative. Instead of launching a transparent, competitive international tender process to attract proven operators, he has staked his entire political reputation on the success of this single, opaque agreement with a phantom consortium. This deal, for better or for worse, will now be the defining measure of his tenure.

"This is not a photo-op government," declared the #Somaliland Minister of Presidency @khadarlooge. Yet, while Minister Fuad Nuh invests in professionally directed slow-mo videos for TikTok from his lavish office, #Hargeisa's #Egal International closes at sunset for lack of basic… pic.twitter.com/gZRbJ2m6RV
— Somaliland Chronicle (@SomalilandChro1) June 19, 2025

Faced with this looming crisis, the government has scrambled to sign a $70 million concession agreement with an entity calling itself International Maharat Investment. The problem? The public has been given no reason to trust that the government has competently vetted this ghost firm. This is not merely a story about one airport deal; it is a case study of a government that, despite commanding over half a billion dollars annually, consistently delivers substandard results while blaming external factors for failures rooted in its own institutional incompetence and a well-documented history of corruption.

A Company with No Past — and a $70M Future

Corporate registry searches reveal only a single trace of Maharat’s existence: an Omani registration dated August 13, 2023, listing one Mohammed Oday Fahad Al Mutar. Beyond this document, there is no record of Maharat ever completing an infrastructure project, let alone one as technically demanding as a major airport.

To be clear, this is not Favori LLC, the controversial Turkish company that manages Mogadishu’s airport and whose representatives recently met with Somaliland’s Investment Minister, sparking separate sovereignty concerns. The Maharat deal is an entirely different arrangement, yet it carries its own profound risks tied to the consortium’s complete lack of a verifiable track record.

Sources describe Maharat as “a consortium of wealthy Middle Eastern businesspeople,” but this does not excuse the fundamental questions: Why was there no competitive tender? What credible criteria were used to evaluate Maharat’s financial capacity and technical competence?

A Runway Built on Corruption

This crisis stems directly from corruption, with roots leading back to prominent political figures still active today. The last major runway reconstruction in 2013 was funded by a $10 million Kuwait Fund grant and overseen by Mr. Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, who at the time was the Minister of Aviation and later a powerful Minister of the Presidency. Mr. Hashi, now the chairman of the Kaah political party and a presidential hopeful, presided over a project that was designed to guarantee a decade of safe operations. Instead, contractors reportedly used substandard materials and thinner asphalt, cutting the lifespan nearly in half.

The current concession process shows identical rot. Sources claim former Airport Director Omar Sayid Abdilahi, allegedly with partners from the previous President’s office, demanded $3 million to sign the project’s Memorandum of Understanding. Current officials dispute this account, stating their negotiations with Maharat began independently when representatives met President Cirro during his Dubai visit.

Current officials claim extensive verification over several months, including visits to every country where Maharat reportedly operates. They describe the final agreement as resulting from major renegotiations. However, our investigation cannot verify these claims until the government shares project mechanics and especially details about Maharat itself—providing the public assurance their most precious asset is secure.

Then there’s the unresolved $3.25 million deposited in Somaliland’s UAE investment account for the now-cancelled presidential palace project. Only $2.7 million reportedly remains. The unexplained disappearance of $550,000, vaguely attributed by former UAE Representative Badmaax to “18th of May celebrations,” has never been credibly accounted for.

Somaliland’s Habit of Falling for Transformational Mirages

This pattern of questionable deals is tragically familiar. The much-hyped Singapore-backed New Silk Oil Refinery and the billion-dollar Chinese bank both evaporated because minimal verification would have revealed them as fraudulent schemes. The sole counterexample remains DP World’s Berbera Port concession, which succeeded precisely because it brought transparency and proven competence. Ironically, President Cirro, then in opposition, denounced that deal as treasonous. His administration now champions an airport deal that would collapse under a fraction of the scrutiny DP World endured.

Due Diligence and the Anatomy of a Disaster

Somaliland’s diplomatic isolation limits its investor pool, but limited options do not grant the government a license to abandon its most fundamental duty: to protect the nation’s assets through rigorous due diligence. Due diligence isn’t bureaucratic theater; it’s the firewall between a successful project and a catastrophic failure. What expertise does Aviation Minister Fuad Ahmed Nuh or the Presidency possess to navigate the balance between necessary secrecy and essential verification? This isn’t routine contract management—it requires sophisticated intelligence gathering and financial forensics that challenge even recognized states.

The Laforug Lesson

For those who consider this a hypothetical risk, the wreckage of the Laforug bridge offers a chilling lesson in the real-world cost of failed oversight. Washed away by floods on the vital Berbera corridor, this was a key component of a project funded by the highly reputable Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. This presents the central, damning question: If a project backed by a world-class institution can collapse due to a complete failure of local supervision, what hope exists for an airport built by an unvetted ghost firm? The Laforug disaster proves that the government’s watchdog role is non-negotiable.

The President’s Absence: A Calculated Distance?

Adding another layer of intrigue to the deal is the conspicuous absence of President Cirro himself from the final signing ceremony. Instead, the Presidency was represented by the all-powerful Minister of the Presidency, Mr. Khadar Loge. For a head of state known to be deeply concerned with cementing his legacy, and who is often present for far more trivial ribbon-cutting ceremonies, the decision to distance himself from the signing of what is being touted as a cornerstone project is telling. It raises an unavoidable question: Is the President hedging his bets, creating plausible deniability for a deal he knows is deeply flawed?

The Final Test: A New Runway, Old Interests, and the Courage to Govern

The litany of red flags surrounding this deal—the phantom firm, the tainted process, the history of failed oversight—all lead to a final, unavoidable test. The success or failure of this $70 million gamble will not be determined by press conferences, but by the government’s ability to navigate the complex and politically explosive realities on the ground. Before this project proceeds, the administration must provide a clear and binding plan for two critical challenges:

1. The Question of Land and Livelihoods: A New Runway According to sources familiar with the agreement, the deal’s primary component is the construction of an entirely new runway, not just a repair of the existing one. It is this new construction that will require additional land to be cleared and annexed to the airport, necessitating the acquisition of privately owned land and potentially the relocation of residents. This raises the critical and sensitive question of eminent domain: What is the government’s plan to ensure that citizens whose land is absorbed for this national project are compensated fairly, transparently, and swiftly, so that they are made whole? A failure to handle this with grace and justice will doom the project’s public legitimacy before the first shovel hits the ground.

2. The Question of Entrenched Interests: An Iron Backbone Egal International Airport is an ecosystem of established, powerful interests, from the current ground handling provider, NASHA, to the existing fuel suppliers and other concession holders. A new operator cannot simply wish them away. What is the government’s strategy for managing these entrenched interests? Will existing contracts be honored, bought out, or steamrolled? This will require not just a clear legal framework, but an iron backbone to stand up to powerful local players who will fight to protect their turf. A failure to manage this transition with clarity and strength will mire the project in years of legal battles and political infighting.

Ultimately, the questions about Maharat’s background, while critical, are secondary to the question of our own government’s capacity. Can it be trusted to protect its citizens’ property? Does it have the courage to manage the powerful interests that have long benefited from the status quo?

Without a credible plan for these real-world challenges, this isn’t a solution to Somaliland’s aviation crisis—it is a $70 million catalyst for a new one.

The Ministries of of Aviation, Presidency and Somaliland’s former UAE Representative, Osman Mohamed Badmaax, did not respond to detailed questions by publication deadline.

As evening approaches and Egal International prepares for its daily shutdown, the lights that should guide aircraft home remain uninstalled—much like the institutional safeguards that should protect Somaliland’s future. The shutdown at dusk isn’t just an operational failure; it’s a metaphor for a government that consistently chooses darkness over transparency. Half a billion dollars in annual budgets should be enough to keep the lights on. That they remain dark speaks to a crisis far deeper than any single airport deal.

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

The Difference Between Somalia “ E-Visa “ system and Somaliland’s “Visa on Arrival” system

Staff

September 13, 2025

During the last 10 days , many circles—particularly those in the diaspora—have expressed confusion between two announcements: the E-Visa system launched by President Hassan Sheikh of Somalia on September 1, 2025, and “ Visa on Arrival “ policy announced by Somaliland on September 9, 2025. While the timing of these announcements may have contributed to the confusion, it is essential to understand that these two systems are different systems, implemented by two separate jurisdictions .

1. Somalia’s E-Visa System

A foreign visitor to Somalia must apply online before traveling.
The application requires completing a digital form, uploading supporting documents (such as a passport copy and travel itinerary), and paying a fee of $64.
Once processed and approved, the applicant receives an electronic visa (E-Visa) by email, which must be presented upon arrival at Somali entry points.
While convenient for some, this process requires internet access, advance planning, and prior approval, which can discourage spontaneous or last-minute travelers.

2. Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival System

A foreign visitor to Somaliland does not need to apply online.
The traveler simply boards a flight and receives a visa directly upon arrival at airports or border checkpoints.
Requirements include a valid passport, supporting documents (such as a return ticket and accommodation details), and payment of the applicable fee.

Previous Policy of Somaliland Visa System.

Historically, Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival privilege was restricted to citizens of 49 countries, grouped as follows:

• European Union (27 countries)
• Gulf States (6 countries): Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait
• IGAD States (6 countries): Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda
• Other key countries (10): Canada, USA, Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia

New Somaliland Visa System.

Under the updated framework, citizens of all 193 United Nations member states are now eligible for Visa on Arrival in Somaliland. This represents a dramatic expansion of accessibility and inclusivity.

Broader Economic & Diplomatic Impact of Somaliland’s “Visa on Arrival” system

Tourism and Foreign Currency Inflows – Easier Visa access will encourage international tourists, generating revenue for hotels, transport, restaurants, and heritage sites.
Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – Simplified entry procedures send a welcoming signal to global investors who often value streamlined travel formalities as part of the business environment.
Strengthening of Diplomatic and Social Ties – By welcoming travelers from all UN member states, Somaliland expands its international visibility, fosters cultural exchange, and underscores its political maturity as a self-governing entity.
Soft Power and Recognition – Visa liberalization is a tool of statecraft. It demonstrates Somaliland’s openness, capacity for governance, and readiness to interact with the global community—an important step in its pursuit of international recognition.

Conclusion

While Somalia’s E-Visa represents a controlled, pre-arranged system of digital approvals, Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival offers flexibility, inclusivity, and an immediate gateway for travelers from around the world. The latter positions Somaliland as a welcoming hub for tourism, investment, and diplomacy, while reinforcing its status as a distinct and self-administered nation.

About the Author

Mr. Ali Ibrahim “Baqdaadi“ is the former Governor of Somaliland Central Bank, Hargeisa.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

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Country	Passport Count	Percentage
Kenya	13,325	37.62%
United Kingdom	3,027	8.55%
United States	2,298	6.49%
Netherlands	2,040	5.76%
Colombia	1,686	4.76%
Sweden	1,679	4.74%
Norway	1,058	2.99%
Canada	972	2.74%
India	795	2.24%
Finland	588	1.66%
Ethiopia	563	1.59%
Somalia	561	1.58%
Uganda	556	1.57%
Pakistan	458	1.29%
Denmark	366	1.03%
Turkey	357	1.01%
Belgium	290	0.82%
Yemen	259	0.73%
Bangladesh	232	0.66%
Syria	222	0.63%
Australia	221	0.62%
Switzerland	198	0.56%
China	186	0.53%
South Africa	184	0.52%
Italy	177	0.50%

Investigative Reports

Security Influence

Economic Influence

2,298 Americans on a Terrorist Kill List

The Payment Fraud: $288k Stolen, Zero Recourse

608 ‘Rapid-Fire’ Transactions: The Smoking Gun

Mastercard’s $288k Problem

A “Sovereign” System on a Shared Florida Server

Total System Compromise: Passwords Published Online

Washington Confirms the Breach—But What Can It Do?

The Silence of Western Allies

The Questions Washington Must Answer

The Reckoning

Catastrophic breach includes personal details of evisa applicants, system admin passwords and banking data, handing terrorists a verified list of 35,000 targets, including 2,298 Americans and 3,027 Britons.

Global Impact: Break down by nationality

Your Bank Account is Compromised

This is Not a Corporate Data Breach: It’s a Kill List

Administrative Access: The System is Conquered

What Must Happen Now

About the Author

6– Conclusion

7– Recommendations

1. Establish a Permanent Municipal Infrastructure Planning and Coordination Authority

2. Develop a Comprehensive Urban Master Plan with Integrated Infrastructure Components

3. Improve Infrastructure Financing and Establish a Dedicated Municipal Fund

4. Enforce Urban Zoning, Building Regulations, and Drainage Protection Measures

5. Strengthen Technical Capacity, Research, and Quality Control in Infrastructure Development

6. Prioritize Drainage and Flood Management as Core Infrastructure

7. Expand Social Infrastructure: Healthcare, Education, and Recreation

8. Adopt Climate-Resilient Urban Design and Sustainable Practices

The UAE Factor: A Diplomatic Puzzle

The High-Wire Act of Horn Diplomacy

What’s on the Table?

Reconsidering the Partnership: Has Ethiopia Proven Itself Worthy?

The American Factor: Washington’s Growing Embrace

The Regional Chess Game

A Closing Window of Opportunity

The Verdict Awaits

Key Points

Puntland’s Strategic Drift from Mogadishu

The Geopolitical Undercurrents: The US and UAE Connection

Competing Principles: The Dialectic of Borders and Bloodlines

The Reality of SSC-Khatumo’s Circumscribed Authority

From a Paradigm of Confrontation to One of Cooperation

Implications for the Regional Order

Domestic Political Controversy: Constitutional Questions and Status Anxiety

The Sool Dilemma: Strategic Opportunity versus Asymmetric Risk

A Foundation for Peace

About the Author

A Company with No Past — and a $70M Future

A Runway Built on Corruption

Somaliland’s Habit of Falling for Transformational Mirages

Due Diligence and the Anatomy of a Disaster

The Laforug Lesson

The President’s Absence: A Calculated Distance?

The Final Test: A New Runway, Old Interests, and the Courage to Govern

1. Somalia’s E-Visa System

2. Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival System

Previous Policy of Somaliland Visa System.

New Somaliland Visa System.

Broader Economic & Diplomatic Impact of Somaliland’s “Visa on Arrival” system

Conclusion

About the Author

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