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HARGEISA – President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” of the Republic of Somaliland has departed for Addis Ababa on an official visit to Ethiopia, marking his first trip to the neighboring country since assuming office in January 2025. The high-stakes diplomatic mission arrives at a critical juncture for Horn of Africa geopolitics, nine months after Ethiopia signed the Ankara Declaration with Somalia—a move that left the future of the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding hanging in the balance.
The timing of the visit is particularly intriguing. President Cirro departed for Ethiopia just one day after returning from his third trip to the United Arab Emirates this year—a visit that lasted more than two weeks. Sources familiar with the President’s UAE engagements, speaking on strict condition of anonymity, confirmed that Cirro held meetings with high-level Emirati officials during his extended stay. Whether the immediate pivot to Addis Ababa is connected to these UAE discussions remains unclear, but the sequencing has not escaped the attention of regional analysts.
The President’s delegation, which departed from Hargeisa today aboard a chartered aircraft, includes the Ministers of Finance, Public Works, and Investment. Notably, several key officials had already traveled to Addis Ababa in advance of the President’s arrival, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of the National Armed Forces, and the Director of National Intelligence. This advance team’s presence underscores the meticulous preparation surrounding what promises to be consequential talks.
The UAE Factor: A Diplomatic Puzzle
The elephant in the room is the UAE connection. President Cirro’s three trips to Abu Dhabi since taking office—with the most recent lasting over two weeks—represent an unusually intense diplomatic engagement with the Gulf state. The UAE has positioned itself as a critical player in Horn of Africa dynamics, with massive investments in both Somaliland’s Berbera Port (managed by DP World) and the Berbera Corridor connecting the port to Ethiopia’s industrial heartland.
The Emirati government also maintains close ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, having supported his administration through various domestic and regional challenges. As one analyst noted in a previous Somaliland Chronicle piece, “The rise of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister of Ethiopia solidified Addis Ababa’s relations with Abu Dhabi. UAE supported Abiy’s major domestic and foreign policy objectives.”
Could the UAE be facilitating a diplomatic reset between Somaliland and Ethiopia? The timing—departing for Addis just 24 hours after returning from a lengthy Abu Dhabi stay—suggests coordination at the highest levels. The UAE has both the economic interests and the political capital to broker a revival of the Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership, particularly given its substantial investments in infrastructure projects that would benefit enormously from stable bilateral relations.
Sources who spoke to Somaliland Chronicle refused to confirm any direct connection between the UAE meetings and the Addis visit, but the circumstantial evidence is compelling. The UAE has consistently demonstrated a preference for pragmatic, business-oriented diplomacy over ideological posturing—exactly the kind of approach that could unlock the strategic gridlock that has paralyzed the Ethiopia-Somaliland relationship since the Ankara Declaration.
The High-Wire Act of Horn Diplomacy
The prolonged delay in President Cirro’s first visit to Ethiopia breaks with historical precedent and has raised eyebrows in both Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. Traditionally, Somaliland presidents have made Ethiopia one of their first foreign destinations after taking office, reflecting the critical nature of the bilateral relationship. That President Cirro waited nearly ten months before making the journey—choosing instead to visit the UAE three times—has fueled speculation about the state of Ethiopia-Somaliland relations.
Whether the delay originated from Somaliland’s side or Ethiopia’s remains unclear, but the resulting perception gap has proven damaging. In a candid January interview with The Reporter Ethiopia, Dr. Dareskedar Taye of Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs remarked that “the new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.” Such perceptions from Ethiopian officials, warranted or not, underscore how the absence of high-level engagement can breed misunderstanding and mistrust.
Such perceptions have real consequences. Ethiopia’s pivot toward Somalia through Turkish-mediated talks—culminating in the December 2024 Ankara Declaration—effectively shelved the original MoU that promised Ethiopian recognition in exchange for naval access to Berbera. For many Somalilanders, watching Ethiopia pursue alternative arrangements through Mogadishu felt like a betrayal of the strategic partnership that had been decades in the making.
Yet the fundamental realities that made the January 2024 MoU inevitable remain unchanged. Ethiopia’s landlocked status, its crippling dependency on Djibouti (which handles 95 percent of its trade at a cost of over $1.5 billion annually), and the geographic proximity of its industrial heartland to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast create an inescapable strategic logic. The Turkish-led mediation’s failure to produce a viable alternative through Somalia has, if anything, vindicated the original Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership.
What’s on the Table?
According to the presidential statement, discussions will focus on “strengthening historical ties, strategic cooperation, and mutual interests, particularly in security, economy, trade, and movement between the two countries.” But the real question is whether this visit will breathe new life into the original MoU or forge an entirely new framework for cooperation.
In an exclusive interview with Somaliland Chronicle last month, former President Muse Bihi Abdi of the Republic of Somaliland offered a candid assessment of why the original MoU failed to materialize. Bihi indicated that Ethiopia succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland. His remarks provide crucial context for understanding what’s at stake in President Cirro’s current mission: is this trip a genuine opportunity for Ethiopia to attempt a reset—pursuing Red Sea access and recognition through an “MoU 2.0” framework—or merely a diplomatic courtesy call between new partners?
The answer could define the trajectory of Horn of Africa geopolitics for the next generation.
Reconsidering the Partnership: Has Ethiopia Proven Itself Worthy?
The original MoU’s failure raises uncomfortable questions that President Cirro’s administration must confront head-on: Is Ethiopia a reliable partner, or merely a fair-weather friend that retreats at the first sign of external pressure?
The evidence suggests the latter. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s January 2024 agreement with President Bihi was heralded as a historic breakthrough—Ethiopia’s quest for sea access finally aligned with Somaliland’s three-decade pursuit of recognition. Yet within months, as regional pushback intensified, Abiy pivoted. Rather than standing by his commitments to Somaliland, he pursued the Ankara Declaration with Somalia, effectively abandoning his Hargeisa partners in favor of appeasing Mogadishu, Ankara, and Cairo.
Former President Bihi’s assessment in his exclusive Somaliland Chronicle interview was damning but diplomatic: Ethiopia “succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland.” A more blunt reading would be that when tested, Abiy folded. The question facing Cirro is whether any “MoU 2.0” would fare differently, or if Somaliland would again find itself jilted once Egypt applies pressure through the GERD negotiations, or Turkey threatens to cut development finance, or Somalia mobilizes another regional coalition.
The strategic landscape has fundamentally shifted since January 2024, and not in Ethiopia’s favor. Then, Addis Ababa was Somaliland’s most promising suitor—the only regional power with both the motivation and the means to offer recognition. Today, Somaliland faces an embarrassment of riches. The United States Congress is actively legislating direct bilateral ties through a representative office in Hargeisa. Senator Cruz, who chairs the Africa subcommittee, is personally lobbying President Trump for full recognition. American strategic interest in countering China, accessing Berbera’s port and 4-kilometer airstrip, and establishing a foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has never been higher.
This shifts the negotiating calculus entirely. Somaliland no longer needs to offer Ethiopia a sweetheart deal in exchange for recognition that may or may not materialize depending on Abiy’s domestic political calculations or his willingness to weather regional pressure. Instead, Hargeisa can negotiate from a position of strength: If Ethiopia wants preferential access to Berbera over Djibouti, what is Addis Ababa prepared to offer beyond vague promises that crumbled once before?
Any MoU 2.0 discussion must include ironclad guarantees that were absent from the original agreement. Ethiopia must commit to immediate, not gradual, recognition—with a clear timeline and public announcements that preclude backtracking. The terms must be structured to survive external pressure: legally binding treaties ratified by both parliaments, not memoranda that can be quietly shelved when convenient. And crucially, Somaliland must secure concurrent commitments from other partners—the UAE, potentially the United States—that create a web of relationships too costly for any single party to abandon.
President Cirro’s challenge is not simply to resurrect the MoU, but to determine whether Ethiopia has learned from its failure and is prepared to act like a serious partner—or whether Somaliland’s future lies not in Addis Ababa’s uncertain promises, but in Washington’s legislative momentum and Abu Dhabi’s patient capital. The fact that Cirro spent two weeks in the UAE before flying to Ethiopia for what may be only a 2-3 day visit speaks volumes about where Somaliland’s strategic priorities—and expectations—now lie.
Ethiopia had its chance to be the historic first. Now it must compete for the privilege.
The original January 2024 agreement—signed by President Muse Bihi Abdi and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—granted Ethiopia a 50-year lease on 20 kilometers of Somaliland coastline for commercial and military purposes, with the understanding that Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. The deal also included provisions for Somaliland to acquire stakes in Ethiopian Airlines and deepened security cooperation, including a comprehensive training program for approximately 8,000 Somaliland commandos.
President Cirro, who opposed aspects of the deal during his time as opposition leader, has been characteristically measured in his public statements about the MoU. His April address to Parliament conspicuously omitted any reference to the agreement, leading some observers to question his commitment to the partnership. This visit to Addis Ababa will either dispel those doubts or confirm Ethiopia’s worst fears.
The American Factor: Washington’s Growing Embrace
While Ethiopia hedged and Somalia raged, a seismic shift has been unfolding in Washington that could fundamentally alter the calculus for all parties involved. The United States—long content to maintain studied ambiguity on Somaliland’s status—appears to be abandoning its traditional posture in favor of direct engagement that stops just short of formal recognition.
In August 2025, Senator Ted Cruz, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, sent a formal letter to President Trump urging immediate recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The letter was notable not just for its unequivocal stance, but for the strategic framework Cruz outlined: “Somaliland has emerged as a critical security and diplomatic partner for the United States, helping America advance our national security interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.”
Cruz’s letter emphasized Somaliland’s strategic location “along the Gulf of Aden, putting it near one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors,” and highlighted a crucial geopolitical dimension that directly threatens Somaliland’s partnership with both Ethiopia and the UAE: “The Chinese Communist Party is using economic and diplomatic coercion to punish Somaliland for its support for Taiwan, as well as to undermine that support.”
But the most significant development came one month later. In September 2025, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced H.R. 5300, the Department of State Policy Provisions Act, which includes Section 305: “Ensuring smooth travel and investment in Somaliland.” The language is bureaucratic, but its implications are revolutionary.
The bill explicitly directs the Secretary of State to consider “establishing a representative office in Hargeisa, Somaliland” and creating separate “bifurcation of travel advisory warnings between Somalia and Somaliland.” This isn’t mere symbolism—it represents the legislative groundwork for direct bilateral diplomatic relations between the United States and Somaliland, independent of Mogadishu.
A U.S. representative office in Hargeisa would constitute de facto recognition, creating a direct diplomatic channel that bypasses Somalia entirely. It would make the United States the first major power to establish such a presence, fundamentally legitimizing Somaliland’s claim to statehood in ways that decades of functional independence could not achieve alone. For context, this is the exact pathway the United States used to maintain relations with Taiwan—a representative office that functions as an embassy in all but name.
The timing of this American interest creates both opportunity and urgency for President Cirro’s Ethiopia visit. If Washington beats Addis Ababa to the punch by establishing that representative office and offering Somaliland security guarantees—perhaps including access to Berbera for U.S. naval operations—Ethiopia’s unique leverage evaporates overnight. The port-for-recognition equation only works if Ethiopia is the first mover. If America moves first, Somaliland gains recognition without needing to offer Ethiopia anything beyond continued trade access.
This emerging American interest may explain the UAE connection. Abu Dhabi, which maintains close ties with both Washington and Addis Ababa, has every incentive to coordinate between the three parties to ensure their massive infrastructure investments in Berbera and the corridor to Ethiopia don’t become casualties of competing recognition bids. Could President Cirro’s extended UAE consultations have been aimed at orchestrating a synchronized approach—one where American diplomatic support, Ethiopian recognition, and Emirati economic backing all converge to create an irresistible momentum toward Somaliland’s emergence as the world’s newest nation?
The Regional Chess Game
The stakes extend far beyond bilateral relations. The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership triggered a diplomatic tantrum from Somalia, which mobilized support from Egypt, Turkey, and increasingly, China in a single-minded campaign to prevent Somaliland’s recognition at any cost. Somalia’s approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active proxy warfare, including fueling the Las Anod crisis in a calculated attempt to destabilize Somaliland from within. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s inflammatory rhetoric—reportedly declaring “jihad” from mosque pulpits and threatening alignment with Al-Shabaab—underscores how Mogadishu has prioritized blocking Somaliland over governing its own territory.
Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Turkey’s February 2024 defense pact with Somalia established a naval presence explicitly designed to counter Ethiopian maritime ambitions. For these actors, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than addressing terrorism, state failure, or economic development.
Meanwhile, Djibouti—which stands to lose billions in port revenue from any Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership—has taken increasingly hostile actions, including closing Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills. The move was widely interpreted as retaliation for the MoU.
A Closing Window of Opportunity
The legal architecture of any Ethiopian naval base requires a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—a binding international treaty that can only be negotiated between sovereign entities. This creates a de facto recognition pathway that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels, similar to precedents ranging from the US lease of Guantanamo Bay to the progressive recognition of Kosovo.
However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage may be time-limited. Long-standing US strategic interest in Berbera’s airport and port facilities could translate into direct American military presence under a future administration, providing Somaliland an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage. For Addis Ababa, the question is whether to seize this moment or risk watching another power claim the prize.
For President Cirro, the visit represents an opportunity to demonstrate that Somaliland’s new leadership remains committed to the independence project—not through inflammatory rhetoric, but through calculated strategic partnerships. His administration faces a fundamental choice: continue the previous government’s bold gambit for recognition through the Ethiopian partnership, or pursue a more cautious approach that risks squandering three decades of de facto statehood.
The Verdict Awaits
As President Cirro’s aircraft touches down in Addis Ababa, the Horn of Africa holds its breath. This visit could mark the resurrection of the MoU and a decisive step toward Somaliland’s long-sought recognition. Or it could represent another chapter in the endless cycle of diplomatic positioning that has characterized the region for generations.
What is clear is that the geographic and strategic realities haven’t changed. Ethiopia needs reliable sea access. Somaliland needs international recognition. And the alternative—continued dependency on Djibouti, continued isolation for Somaliland, continued instability in Somalia—serves no one’s interests except those actively working to maintain the dysfunctional status quo.
The next 48 hours will reveal whether two leaders with the courage to reshape the Horn’s diplomatic architecture can overcome domestic skeptics, regional spoilers, and international pressure to forge a partnership that reflects geographic reality rather than diplomatic fiction.
Stay tuned to Somaliland Chronicle for comprehensive coverage of President Cirro’s historic visit to Ethiopia.
Presidential Press Release issued by Hussein Adan Cigaal (Deyr), Spokesperson for the President of the Republic of Somaliland
