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Key Points
- New AFRICOM Chief: Gen. Anderson was confirmed on July 31, 2025, and is tasked to confront the “convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”.
- Strategic Shift: AFRICOM’s reported move to Africa signals a major reinvestment, requiring stable continental partners.
- Failed Somalia Strategy: After 30+ years and billions spent with little progress, the U.S. strategy in Somalia is in tatters, positioning the Republic of Somaliland as the logical alternative.
- China’s Direct Threat: Beijing actively pressures Somaliland over its Taiwan ties, alarming U.S. legislators.
- Somaliland’s Proactive Offer: A security pact with Taiwan and a direct offer of a U.S. military base showcase Somaliland as a proactive ally.
Ten days after a nomination hearing on July 22, 2025, where he laid out the strategic challenges facing the continent, the U.S. Senate on July 31, 2025, confirmed General Dagvin R.M. Anderson as the new commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). He now formally takes charge of a command grappling with what he describes as a continent “at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”. His confirmation, combined with his predecessor’s historic, final state visit to Hargeisa, signals a significant evolution in U.S. policy—one that increasingly recognizes the Republic of Somaliland as a critical partner in this new contest.
This renewed focus is underscored by recent reports that AFRICOM headquarters will relocate from Stuttgart, Germany, to Africa itself. Such a move would represent the most significant strategic reinvestment in the continent’s security architecture in a generation. Contrary to any narrative that Africa has been deprioritized, relocating the command center to the continent signals an elevation of its strategic importance. An AFRICOM headquarters in Africa dramatically increases the strategic value of having stable and well-governed partners on the ground, placing a premium on nations that can offer a secure anchor for U.S. presence and policy.
Nowhere is the need for a new approach more apparent than in Somalia. As the former “Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF)”, General Anderson has firsthand knowledge of the deep-seated issues. His praise for the “capable” U.S.-trained Danab special forces during his hearing is now starkly contrasted by reports that the unit is faltering. Due to alleged corruption within the Somali government—a government that consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt in the world on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index—U.S. support has been slashed, crippling the force’s morale and effectiveness. This leaves the 30-year, multi-billion-dollar U.S. strategy in tatters, a failure underscored by recent battlefield losses. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle, Al-Shabaab has retaken the strategic town of El-Bur in the Galgaduud region, a major blow to the government’s offensive, along with several other villages from which government forces have withdrawn.
This institutional shift is no longer subtle. In his final days as commander, General Michael Langley made a historic visit to the Republic of Somaliland on July 28-29, meeting with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” in Hargeisa and touring the strategic port at Berbera. The visit followed his blunt admission that U.S. policy in Somalia has struggled, with Al-Shabaab remaining “entrenched, wealthy, and large.” Langley’s trip, a clear signal of AFRICOM’s search for more reliable partners, builds on a precedent set by former AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend, who also toured the Berbera corridor in 2022. For General Anderson, the value of such reliable allies is paramount. He powerfully illustrated this point by recounting a successful hostage rescue in Niger: “Within 96 hours, we located him, coordinated with multiple African partners and European allies, and executed the rescue”. His conclusion was a lesson for the entire command: “When we called in the middle of the night, our partners answered”.
This American interest is driven by an intensifying strategic competition that has become a direct threat to the Republic of Somaliland itself. China has reportedly engaged in a campaign to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty as a direct consequence of its democratic partnership with Taiwan. This has not gone unnoticed in Washington. U.S. legislators, including Senator Ted Cruz, have expressed alarm over what they see as a concerted effort by Beijing to undermine democracies in the Horn of Africa. Senator Cruz praised the Republic of Somaliland’s partnership with Taiwan as a courageous stand against Chinese pressure and has warned that Beijing uses its Belt and Road Initiative to "trap African nations in debt", leveraging that debt to erode their sovereignty and gain control over critical resources.
In the corridors of the Pentagon, a new and alarming scenario is being considered: that the Horn of Africa is becoming the laboratory for China’s first overseas kinetic action. The concern is that Beijing, frustrated by diplomatic and economic pressure, is now experimenting with proxy warfare to achieve its goals. Reports suggest a quiet funneling of arms and funds to shadowy regional militias, designed not for outright conquest, but to bleed and pressure the Republic of Somaliland, punishing it for its democratic alliance with Taiwan. For the new AFRICOM commander, this represents a dangerous evolution—a cold war turning hot on the shores of the Red Sea.
In the face of these threats, Somaliland has demonstrated its value as a proactive security partner. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle on July 24, 2025, Hargeisa signed a landmark maritime security pact with Taiwan, explicitly designed to safeguard international shipping lanes and counter shared threats in the Red Sea. This was followed by a direct offer to Washington. In a Bloomberg interview, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” made an explicit and compelling offer to the United States: full partnership in exchange for recognition. He put access to a strategic military base on the Red Sea and deals for critical minerals squarely on the table, stating, “If the US is interested to land in Somaliland they are most welcome.” This is not an appeal for aid; it is a direct proposal for a security-for-recognition agreement that aligns perfectly with Washington’s need to counter Chinese influence.
With a newly-confirmed commander who has direct experience with the pitfalls of past policy, and a predecessor who made a historic visit to Hargeisa, the stage is set for a significant evolution in U.S. strategy. The facts on the ground—from the crumbling of the Danab force to the direct threat from China and Somaliland’s tangible offer of partnership—make a robust, strategic alliance with the Republic of Somaliland the logical and necessary conclusion.
